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Introduction 
 
In this study we compute the efficiency scores of fourteen Italian water utilities 
and nineteen Portuguese utilities providing drinking water and wastewater 
services, for a total of 44 utility; using the benchmarking non parametric 
technique of Data Envelopment Analysis, a technique of performance evaluation, 
that it is well-known, above all thanks to the development of specific softwares. 
In this work, to identify scores, we used MATLAB software.  
This analysis started during my stay in Portugal, thanks also to the significant 
collaboration of professor Rui Cuenha Marques and his staff, in particular 
professor Diogo Cunha Ferreira. 
I would like to thank publicly the two professors, who have enjoyed this project 
from the very start, for the opportunity given to me, which is something not 
everyone is lucky to have. Their collaboration and their patience have been 
fundamental for this work’s achievement. I would not have made it without their 
support. 
The first part of the work was the creation of the database for both countries 
objects of confrontation, Italy and Portugal, this part has been made in the host 
country with a weekly supervision from both professors. As far as Portugal is 
concerned, professor Marques kindly supplied us the right equipment for the 
construction of the database; on the Italian part the work has been more complex 
since we have analysed all the balances of the companies involved. 
The next step has been the one to learn and become conscious of the DEA model 
use, which is the model chosen to measure the efficiency of the various 
enterprises. At the same time though, a specific software is necessary in order to 
carry it out. The software chosen was MATLAB. 
Through numerous meetings and explanations, above all with professor Ferreira, 
first we provided the choice of inputs and outputs adequate to develop the model, 
and in the end, after some issues brilliantly solved by the scrupulous help of both 
professors, who I would never stop thanking, we came to calculate the scores to 
value the efficiency or inefficiency of the enterprises involved. 
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 All of this motivated me to develop this type of confrontation and measurement 
between the two countries, Italy and Portugal. At the same time, with the help 
and the supervision of both professor, we learnt to use the softeware MAtlab to 
develop the DEA model.  
Before describing the work, it may be opportune to make some observations, 
since it turns out to be a preliminary work. Indeed, although we confronted a 
high number of companies, it has some limits. The first one is the temporal 
confrontation. As far as Portugal is concerned, in fact, the data we came to 
collect were related to 2014. On the other hand, as far as Italy is concerned, we 
decided to build the database taking into consideration both 2014 and 2015. 
The second limit is due to the fact that a few observations have been made about 
it, since the data available were not complete or were out of our control. All of 
this, in some cases, brought also to reduce our sample of analysis 
Finally, the third limit is due to the DEA model itself. The model involved allows 
only to calculate if the Decision Makers Units is efficient or not (<1 inefficient 
and >1 efficient). It does not give us any information about the causes of a 
possible inefficiency or efficiency. In any case, even though briefly, we tried to 
give an explanation to the results, above all in the situations where the DEA 
model score was inefficient. 
The topic discussed in this composition concerns the efficiency analysis of a 
whole of independent organizational unities in the companies of the water sector. 
In the last decade this topic has been strongly discussed, since in the current 
economic context of increasing competition and dynamism turns out to be 
decisive for a company to know both their own grade of efficiency compared to 
the competitors and the efficiency related to the different internal operative 
unities (divisions, departments, functions) or to the single employees. This work 
is located in a managerial study field defined with the term benchmarking. 
Benchmarking is an efficient method to measure and increase the performances 
of the operative unities. The systematic use of methods and instruments of 
benchmarking spurs and integrates the processes of acknowledgement and 
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change and, in the same time, spurs the efficacy and efficiency of the company 
processes and the renovation of the company culture, assuring a continuous 
improvement thanks to the constant confrontation with the other unities, both 
internal and external. It is a technique that provide different phases, like the 
identification of the area taken into consideration for the analysis, the indicators 
to confront, the data collection, the results elaboration and in the end the 
evaluation and control of the latter. Objects of our analysis have been companies 
located in Italy and Portugal. 
Before getting into our homes, water goes through a long and complex supply 
chain, with many steps that require an important engagement of people and 
instruments  to  work. 
 
Our legislator provided that the services which constitute the so-called Servizio 
Idrico Integrato, SII, are: interception, collection and distribution of water for 
civil uses,  drainage and deputation of wastewater.  
Our water supply chain presents big differences among the territorial areas and 
general proms of inefficiency. We space from non-homogeneity of resource 
distribution and quality to pollution of layers, plus the miserable maintenance 
status of the installations, which are often hit by network losses.  
 
So to find a good functioning of water sector, in the last decades Italy, started a 
reform path reorganization of the industry, pursuing the aim of service 
improvement and trying to overcome criticalities.  
 
With the so- called Galli-law the reform of the sector begins its long and 
low path. In Italy before the implement of the law, water service was 
managed in a fragmentary way at a town country level, with too many 
companies operating in the sector. Beyond the problems of managerial 
inefficiency for the missed opportunity of exploitation of possible scale 
economies, the sector was penalized on state balances, since the very low 
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tariffs did cover costs, but wew not sufficient to let the companies do 
investments.  
Then, the law nr. 36/94 delegates the legislative power in this field to 
regions and defines the Servizio Idrigo Integrato (SII); plus it creates the 
compulsoriness of a new territorial dimension of reference, the Ambito 
Territoriale Ottimale (ATO), with the purposes to unify the services and 
to concentrate the managements to obtain scale economies (indeed it has 
been decided to have a manager for ATO) through the horizontal and 
vertical supply chain; so, in general to start an effective and efficient 
organisation of the sector.  
 
On the other side, we analysed the water sector of Portugal. The Portuguese 
water system includes water supply and the collection and treatment of 
wastewater. Both segments are considered services of public interest, essential 
for the citizens’ wealth, the public sanity and for the economic and 
environmental activities (law nr. 23/1996 and law nr. 12/2008). This is the reason 
why these services have to respect a series of principles, aimed to guarantee its 
universal access, an high quality standard and an equal and efficient system of 
tariffs
1
. In the sector about 300 managers are active and they serve almost 10,49 
millions of inhabitants distributed on an area of 93.400 km²
2
; as far as structure is 
concerned, the system is deverticalized with the separation of wholesale supply 
and of the wastewater collection (retail or end-users segment or baixa). The 
wholesale segment is carried out exclusively by multi-municipal operators who 
are almost totally public, while the retail one includes different models of 
management that allow the access to the private capital. 
 
 
 
                                      
1
 Ersar, 2014 
2
 Ersar, 2014 
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In particular, three different model of management are identified: 
 
- the direct management: it includes the town county management (without 
a reserved organisational unity) and the municipalized services, in which 
the service is directly supplied from the town county thanks to an 
organisational unity, having countable and financial autonomy, but 
missing the legal one, and the unions of town counties;  
- the delegated management: it includes the companies of town county 
property, the instituted companies in partnership with the state (municipal 
or state companies) and the associations of consumers; 
-  the concession: it includes the municipal authorized dealers and the 
public/private partnerships, composed by one or more town counties and 
other private operators. The contract of concession can have a maximum 
duration of 50 years and fixes the rights and obligations of the authorized 
dealer, and the methods of yearly revision of the tariffs. 
 
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a method used for the measurement of 
efficiency in the Decision-Making Units (DMU) like, for example, enterprises or 
public institutions. It has been developed in theory by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes in 1978 as a technique based on the linear program.   
 
So, our work will be structured in this way: a first part which we can define 
descriptive and a second one which we can define analytic. In fact, the first 
chapter will analyse in detail the concept of benchmarking, since our whole work 
is based on that. We are going to explain the importance of this methodology for 
the company management and its application in the water companies. 
 
The second and third chapters, respectively, will describe, both at market and 
regulation level, the water sector in Italy and  Portugal.  
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The analytic part takes into consideration, first, the fourth chapter, where we tried 
our best to explain the concept of efficiency and why today turns out to be so 
fundamental for companies, passing then to describe the used methodology. 
Finally, in the last chapter, the fifth, we reported our sample and the data, that 
have been directly elaborated in the foreign country during my personal 
permanence there, and to conclude, the  results. 
 
Plus, to end with, we reported the database used for the sample. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Analysis of the Benchmarking 
What is Benchmarking? 
 
The object to continually research organisational and management solutions 
having a new process is a current duty that is pressing for the enterprises 
operating in competition among the various markets. The subject nowadays is 
important both for the big enterprises and for the small ones, both for the 
enterprises made for services and for the ones creating new products, both for the 
public ones and the private ones.  
It all began in the Seventies when benchmarking, seen as a new instrument at 
management’s disposal, useful for the identification and the carrying out of the 
company choices, has been acknowledged by many enterprises and in the 
planning contexts (both in medium and small ones) and its diffusion concerns all 
the industrialised countries. 
The analysis of benchmarking was born with the aim to operate a comparison 
among the companies and, considering the identified critical factors, to identify 
best practices that can be a point of reference for the other competitor companies 
and more. The identification of best practices is carried out to understand which 
elements are the primary and fundamental ones that have allowed many 
companies to reach better performances than the competitors’ ones. 
Consequently, to understand what best practices are is the first step for an 
analysis of  benchmarking. 
Before describing benchmarking in detail, maybe it is useful to go into the 
conception of best practices. With “best practices” we usually mean the best 
normal procedures for companies obtained in a certain market sector. In fact, 
they constitute a model to refer to and, considering them, it is possible to value 
one’s shares with the relative results. We can affirm then, that through the 
adequate use of best practices it is possible to reach, maybe easily, best 
performances. Best practices in fact are, most of the times, the causes of the best 
12 
 
performances. Among this, benchmarking and best practices are two elements 
connecting each other, but reflecting two different views.  
 
To understand the origin of the word “benchmark”, and then its use in the 
companies world, we can refer to the definition given by Webster’s English 
dictionary: «A sign of the land surveyor or topographer … of a previously 
determined position … used as a point of reference … a standard to measure or 
value something». The term “bench-mark” derives then from the measurement 
techniques used in topography to identify a sign of planimetric survey useful to 
determine other points. Considering this, the use of the term “benchmark” in 
economy and in the computer sector to indicate a confrontation with a standard, 
being a measure considered useful to judge one’s results/behaviors and to 
improve them. 
The most known definition of benchmark is the one elaborated inside Xerox 
Corporation; Xerox Corporation gave the start to a process of analysis of its 
production costs, with the intent to renovate the system of decisions and to define 
the company objects, and doing so, it had the aim to recover the market share
3
.   
So, that company itself defines this technique in the following way: 
«Benchmarking is the continuous process of measurement of 
products/services/processes through the confrontation with the best competitors 
or the companies recognized as leaders in the various market sectors». 
A definition even more operative is the one that defines benchmark as «the 
research of the best companies normal procedures that lead to a superior 
performance»
4
 . 
In addition to all of this, it is also useful to report other definitions born in other 
companies that through the years have implemented benchmarking, outlining, in 
this way, the area of application of the latter: 
                                      
3
 Senn L., Le imprese del settore idrico in Italia: una analisi di benchmarking, Franco Angeli 
4
 Camp, Robert C, Better you business: benchmark it,business week, pp 73.74 
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 AT&T: «The continuous process of measurement of the current 
companies operations and the confrontation with the best-in-class
5
 
enterprises’ ones. The application of the knowledges obtained through a 
study of benchmarking establishes a basis to make operative plans able to 
reach and surpass the leader industries» 
 3M: «An instrument used to research people able to lead an enterprise in a 
certain process at a so-called “best-in-class” level» 
 FORD: «An approach structured to learn from others and to apply the 
acquired knowledges» 
 ALCOA: «Benchmark is a process of the quality management which uses 
the attitudes of people who are responsible for the process, services and/or 
product to establish the current activities and to put future priorities, in a 
way to gain competitive advantages
6
.» 
These definitions sum up the nature, the objects and the ways of realisation of a 
benchmarking; considering this we can understand a continuous research, wanted 
by the management peaks, to value the efficiency and the efficacy of the 
activities carried out by each component, individual, organisational unity with 
the aim to improve in toto and with a certain continuity the products offer and the 
client/user  services.  
 
In fact, to measure, confront and improve are all activities that, since the 
beginning, companies and entrepreneurs have tried to undertake to reach a dual 
aim: on one hand to analyse one’s performance level with the object to identify 
certain processes, that will be then applied to every single activity for the cost 
minimisation, and on the other one to wonder if the activities carried out by the 
company can still be used to reach a competitive advantage or if it is necessary to 
accomplish certain activities/processes with the aim to change or reshape the 
activities. The main object is, in any case, to identify new solutions that are 
                                      
5
 The locution “best-in-class” indicates that the benchmark must not only carry out confrontations with the direct 
competitors, because they may apply methodologies that are not optimal, but it must address to those enterprises 
(or companies processes) that are considered the best ones or the leader. 
6
 Vincenzo Ferragina, Il benchmarking, Milano, il Sole 24 ore.  
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ameliorative in terms of efficacy and efficiency.  
Observing this, we can affirm then that the benchmark turns out to be an 
instrument that can be integrated among the methods of control, monitoring and 
above all administration and management of the performances; to see 
benchmarking in this way though, this must be developed in strict connection 
both with the planning activities or management control and with the 
organisational projects oriented towards the improvement (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The benchmarking and management control 
 
Source: Review of U. Bocchino, Manuale di benchmarking, Milan, Giuffrè. 
 
 
At the same time, then, we can affirm very confidently that benchmark, through 
its different typologies and its application areas, can analyse strategic and 
competitive aspects (macrobenchmark), considering the competitive 
performances that include single business unities or more (measuring, for 
example, the market share, the growth rate, etc.) and the companies income 
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performances (measuring, for example, the ROI, the cash-flow
7
, the ROS, the 
EBIT, etc.) but also aspects in relation to organisational procedures 
(microbenchmark), placing the emphasis on the measurements of behaviours and 
daily shares with a level of analysis that can concern both the organisational roles 
and the measurement of specific parameters referred to the employees (for 
example, the measurement of the satisfaction level of the employees).  
The aspects which characteristic benchmarking are summed up synthetically in 
figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: characteristic of benchmarking 
 
Source: Review of  U. Bocchino, Manuale di benchmarking, Milan, Giuffrè. 
 
Our analysis can go on, defining the various typologies of benchmarking that are 
most used in the companies contexts. The realisable typologies of benchmark and 
                                      
7
 Cash flow is a variation undergone by the liquidity of an enterprise as an effect of the management limited to a 
determined period of time 
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the application areas vary in relation to the object of the analysis and to the scale 
of the object of the confrontation.  
We can develop then: 
 
 Strategic or competitive benchmarks, oriented towards the analysis of the 
competitors’ behaviours to acknowledge their strong and weak points and 
their strategic behaviours 
 Sectorial benchmarks, which expand the confrontation to a representative 
sample of a sector, that is an entire sector, to offer a more large and 
mediated measure of confrontation 
 Internal benchmark, which examines thoroughly and critically the 
activities carried out inside an enterprise, with the possibility of 
confrontation
8
, if possible. 
In addition to these, there is the best-in-class benchmark type, where the 
confrontation of the indicators, object of analysis, is made with reference, beyond 
the sector, to the more innovative companies normal procedure. 
A more complete definition of the typologies of benchmark can be made in 
relation to the object and the subject whom analysis refers to figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
8
MILONE M., 1996, “Il confronto competitivo ed il Benchmarking”, Cacucci Editore, Bari.  
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Figure 3: Typologies of Benchmarking 
 
Source: Review of U. Bocchino, Manuale di benchmarking, Milan, Giuffrè. 
 
Unlike the traditional competitive analyses then, benchmarking does not consider 
only the competition’s shares and procedures, but tries to take their experience 
and to adapt it to their situation, carrying out a real processes analysis. 
 
We must be careful not to see benchmarking as a case of companies espionage, 
because this is not carried out secretly; on the contrary, it establishes that the 
subjects are aware of it, and between them, there is reciprocity and full 
collaboration both as far as the data exchange is concerned and the application of 
certain  procedures. 
So, concluding, we can affirm that the key word behind the concept of 
benchmarking is confrontation. 
The aim of this model is the optimisation of the performances, both productive 
and organisational, even if we must separate the two distinctly.  
The objective confrontation and the measurement are used to produce clear 
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points of reference, guidelines that must be necessarily shared so that it is 
possible to “produce” and also create the so-called company culture9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
9
 Bocchino U.., 1995, “Manuale di Benchmarking. Come innovare per competere: aspetti operativi, casi pratici e 
problemi”, Giuffrè Editore, Milano. 
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Benchmarking as instrument of strategic management 
 
As we can read in the first paragraph, benchmarking turns out to be an instrument 
of analysis that is developed inside any company that wants to compete with 
other enterprises about certain functions or processes, but also about the whole 
management, without forgetting that benchmarking can be carried out even in the 
internal context of the company, and so we can compare various divisions, 
organisational unities and single activities belonging to the company context 
itself. 
So the aim turns out to be to identify the reasons that brought competitors, above 
all the best ones, to take a certain stand, and to understand, in fact, the developed 
best practices, as described previously. 
Consequently from that analysis, companies identify results that allow to 
understand what the margins for the improvement of the company are, if the 
company model is adequate or not, and to even understand which model to 
follow, to define a proper growth path and development.  
We can assume then that top managers must base their strategy only observing 
and understanding the company’s strong and weak points or analysing the 
external environment, but also considering the systematic and prolonged 
confrontation in time with the other companies. 
With all of this it is possible to start, then, a method that guarantees a 
confrontation with actually better experiences, from where to start to renovate 
strategies, organisation and quality control.    
We already know that benchmarking turns out to be an analysis, and like every 
analysis, it must satisfy some constitutional elements, which must be amused for 
the good realisation of such analysis
10
: 
1. First, benchmarking must be seen as a continuous process not to be carried 
out occasionally; if it has not been implemented at a managerial level first, 
there is no doubt that the activity of continual monitoring of the results 
                                      
10
 Bocchino U. (1995), Manuale di Benchmarking, come innovare per competere. Aspetti operativi, casi 
pratici e problemi, Giuffrè Editore 
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obtained in the processes and in the eventual introduced innovations will 
not be carried out 
2. The benchmarking is a highly complicated process which requires a 
notorious energetic effort, a lot of time and a certain methodicalness; if 
these characteristics are not respected, there is the risk not to obtain what 
the company had preset. So, to try to prevent this problem inside 
companies, some teams working permanently about it should be 
constituted 
3. Benchmarking is something that allows companies to acknowledge, in 
fact it is also called method of acknowledgement, because through his 
carrying out, it allows companies to introduce new capacities inside them 
“capturing” ideas, processes, more attractive activities 
4. Benchmarking allows to adopt an idea to the company context, but it 
surely will not be applied totally inside an enterprise that is carrying out 
the analysis: it is improbable, in fact, that a particular process observed 
externally is adequate to their own situation, without having had 
opportune changes first, because of the management, dimensional and 
environmental conditions, inevitably different
11
. 
5. Benchmarking must be supported by the fact that improvements in the 
company performances take place.  
Beyond the constitutive elements inside an analysis, some determined 
phases must be satisfied, and that is when we are talking about the 
improvement phases of a benchmarking process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
11
 Bocchino U. (1995), Manuale di Benchmarking, come innovare per competere. Aspetti operativi, casi 
pratici e problemi, Giuffrè Editore 
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The main phases are the following: 
 
a. Planning: this phase includes the propaedeutic activities which are 
fundamental for the definition of the whole model of research. It usually 
defines the object of the confrontation, the subjects of it, the 
methodicalness and the analysis time 
b. Data collection: it is the phase when, considering the objects identified 
previously, it is possible to research the most opportune, reliable, 
complete and coherent informations, which will be transferred in a 
specific software.  
 
c. Data analysis: considering the previous phases, it is possible now to 
analyse the data of the collected benchmarks; this is the phase when there 
is the confrontation between the company’s performances to identify the 
GAP and the intervention areas 
d. Plan defining and realisation: it is the operative phase of the previous 
analysis, when new objects are identified on the basis of the GAP; these 
objects, along with their shares and procedures, must be reached to obtain 
the change  
e. Continuous control: once the plan is carried out, it is necessary to follow 
carefully its realisation and to continually monitor the activities and the 
results; in this phase market and competitors should not be lost of sight, 
because new opportunities of develop
12
 can pop up in any moment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
12
 Senn L., Le imprese del settore idrico in Italia: una analisi di benchmarking, Franco Angeli.  
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It all can be seen also graphically: 
 
Figure 4: The  main phases of benchmarking 
 
Source: Review of  da U. Bocchino, Manuale di benchmarking, Milan, Giuffrè 
 
Considering all we have largely described, we understand how companies 
planning processes become fundamental for the companies of any scale and 
sector. 
 
Benchmarking is an instrument extremely useful for the company and it allows it 
to continuously innovate at any level
13
. Defining and constantly updating the 
cornerstone points of the management, projects and activities, benchmarking is 
seen as an essential instrument in all the process of company planning, because it 
can be the joining link between theory and practice starting from consolidated 
and real  situations.
14
 
We have seen how benchmarking can integrate (and often merge) in the strategy, 
defining the objects and the management addresses. Once the benchmark is 
identified, the confrontation that derives from it is based on successful projects 
already developed that, through this process, are furtherly improved. 
                                      
13
 Amato A. e Conti M,The economics of water industry: technology, ownership and efficiency, FrancoAngeli, Milano 
14
 Bocchino U. (1995), Manuale di Benchmarking, come innovare per competere. Aspetti operativi, casi pratici e 
problemi, Giuffrè Editore. 
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In these terms, the industrial plan, meant as material conclusion of the strategic 
planning, not only values the reliability of the roads to path, but also determines 
the concreteness of the previsions. This extremely important aspect also indicates 
the success of the plan, in case of investment’s operations. 
The result is that benchmarking, when used in the development of the business 
plan, tends to satisfy two main functions: 
a. To consolidate the valuations and company’s previsions (mainly internal 
aim); 
b. To reduce the informative gap and the informative opacity among the 
subjects (external relevance)
 15
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
15
 Ferrandina A., Carriero F. (2008), Il business plan, guida strategico-operativa, Seconda Edizione, IPSOA 
Gruppo Wolters Kluwer. 
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Benchmarking applied to the water industry 
 
Water, we obviously know, is a primary good, fundamental for our survival and, 
at the same time, it is a public good
16
 because it turns out to be not competitive 
(the usage of a public good does not imply that another subject cannot use it at 
the same time) and not excludable (once it has been produced, it is not possible 
that a subject who has not incurred the costs to produce it cannot use that good)
17
. 
 
In the modern world, in fact, there is an always-increasing attention about water 
resources and some choices, as far as the system reform, have caused a major 
pressure towards the subjects that work on the water service in a way that they 
improve their performances: major concern to the customers, progressive 
reduction of the environmental impact and reorganisation of the costs through the 
increase of the efficiency in the productive process. All of this, as we can 
imagine, can be reached with the carrying out of the benchmarking analysis. 
Seeing the pressures and the various interests lead to the knowledge of the water 
                                      
16
 In economy, a public good is hard, or impossible, to produce with the aim to gain private profit from 
it. As definition, a public good is characterised by: 
 Absence of competition in the use – the use of a public good by an individual does not imply 
the impossibility for another individual to use it at the same time (it is sufficient to think about 
forms of art like music or painting, for example) 
 Non excludability in the use – once that the public good is produced, it is hard or impossible to 
forbid the subjects to use it, even if they did not pay for it (we can just think about the street 
lightning for example) 
Pure public goods have these properties in the absolute sense. Besides, since public goods are rare 
(though they include important cases like the system of the propriety rights or the national defense), in 
the economists’ slang the term “public good” is generally referred to impure public goods, or public only 
in reference to a particular subset of costumers. It is important to observe that a public good can be 
used by the entire society, while a good which is used only by a subset of costumers should be 
considered a collective good. 
17
 Bartolini A., Le acque tra beni pubblici e pubblici servizi, in I beni pubblici: tutela, valorizzazione e 
gestione, Milano 2008  
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market, there are many cases of benchmarking applied to the management of the 
water resource, and these always turn out to be more reliable to identify and 
understand the performance level to introduce to all of the stakeholders. 
In the water sector, we talk about above all of metric benchmarking, opposing to 
the process one
18
. Metric benchmarking consists in the measurement of the 
performances through a certain number of quantitative indicators, that ends in a 
writing of a sample’s list. This type of analysis puts the single enterprise in the 
conditions to identify their own possible gaps towards the other enterprises of the 
sample, but normally it is not complete, because it does not count the 
environmental variables or the geographical and physic characteristics, the 
climate, the regulator standards and the development of the infrastructures
19
. 
It must be pointed out, though, that this kind of approach may cause two relevant 
risks: first, the information they decide to investigate tend not to have a real 
meaning and this should be a fundamental condition, since the sector presents 
enterprises that have their own characteristics, hardly homologated under one 
category only; second, the other risk is connected to the fact that with such 
methodology of analysis they cannot attribute importance to the environmental 
factors, though the latter have been relevant on the water sector. With the 
presence of these risks then, the main problem is that the results are not so clear, 
nor linear, and this does not allow the company to understand what path to 
follow
20
. 
Along with the metric benchmarking, as we already mentioned, there is the 
process benchmarking. This type of analysis takes start from an analysis of 
determined data, that previously have been inserted inside a ranking, coming 
from the subject that internally is considered the best performer, doing  some 
solutions to the problems of inefficiency can be found out, becoming a real 
process of activity. The following step is to identify or determine the best 
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practices of the water sector that allow to reach a level of performances definitely 
superior. 
The process benchmarking causes then the identification of the activities and 
processes that can be improved through a determined procedure, that is called 
process mapping, step by  step. 
If the metric benchmarking answers the question what (“what do we need to 
grow and improve?”), the process benchmarking answers “how” (“how can we 
grow?”). 
A more complete hypothesis of analysis derives from the combination of metric 
and process benchmarking and it is called performance benchmarking. This third 
option counts all the analysis cycle, from the correct determination of objects and 
indicators until the valuation of what path to apply to the single enterprise to 
reach the levels of best performer. 
In the modern world we can affirm that there is always an increasing interest for 
the compared analysis in the water sector; however not always this is carried out 
in a systematic way, neither it is structured in the most adequate possible way; in 
fact, as previously said, if benchmarking is carried out in a non-constant way, 
this can give a picture which is totally different from the performances, since we 
know benchmarking is a continuous process. 
The introduction of benchmarking in a company that operates in the public 
sector, like water or drainage service, is a process that can be divided into three 
different phases, which are complementary among them, because there is an 
interdependence between actions and results. 
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Figure 5: The question about the benchmarking 
 
Source: R. Cunha Marques and Kristof De Witte, Towards a benchmarking paradigm in European water 
utilities 
 
The first step should be done by a national corporation, possibly independent so 
that it can guarantee a full autonomy of judgement, whose role should be the one 
to press, support and monitor the process of benchmarking inside the 
organisations. In this case we are talking about organisations that manage water 
and/or drainage service on the whole, along with all of this, the corporation has 
the duty to establish the rules of the game and the norms for the confrontation, to 
collect and to publish the results. 
Doing this, it is possible to obtain the best practices, which will be distributed 
inside the entire system, at the same time in this way we can understand which 
the best enterprises of the sector are, since they are probably going to be the 
enterprises of reference. 
In the second phase, at a level of water services, the attention is about the 
activities and processes, so the metric benchmarking, as we previously said, is 
the best option. This procedure tries to answer the question about what to 
improve. 
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In the last phase, the process of benchmarking should be carried out at a level of 
activity. It tries to answer the question about what to improve and allows a more 
precise diagnosis on the causes of inefficiency and consequently, allows to carry 
out an adequate plan for the modifications of the system. 
In this phase the results of benchmarking should be public: it is fundamental that 
these are objective and easy to understand so that there is the certainty and the 
will by the interested parts to guide towards positive changes. 
The whole process of benchmarking analyses the companies trying to answer 
three questions, that are also pictured in the graphic below: 
 
1. Where are we? Intended at a companies level, obviously 
2. Where do we want to go? 
3. How can we reach that position of excellence? 
 
 
 
Source: R. Cunha Marques and Kristof De Witte, Towards a benchmarking paradigm in European water 
utilities 
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The first question requires a diagnosis on the initial situation, with the aim to 
comprehend the possibilities of benchmarking; so the primary point is to define 
what it must be compared and to measure the performances. 
The second phase, “the confrontation”, causes the recognition of the parts to 
analyse; in this phase we confront our company with the one considered as the 
leader in the sector and to understand what the distance to fill is. 
What we have just defined in the second phase brings us directly in the third one, 
where it is necessary to define the actions, carry out them and value their impact. 
Benchmarking is an extremely useful instrument to share experiences, 
knowledges and to identify the best practices of the sector, the so-called leader 
enterprises, so to obtain major efficiency and innovation; so why do not all the 
countries have a corporation that applies everything in the various sectors? Why 
is not there an organ at an European level? 
To answer these questions we have some argumentations.  
First, we must affirm that the European states have always been reluctant to a 
creation both of a corporation at a national level and one at an European level, 
since there should be too many legal difficulties and, besides, we are also talking 
about different interests between countries/regions. Without forgetting that the 
inevitable confrontation between the subjects involved may cause the birth of 
determined conflicts. 
We can understand that the absence of such a corporation largely penalizes the 
European countries that could obtain a better quality of the service at an inferior 
cost. In fact we see that, because of the water service, we hear a lot talking about 
high failures in the market (natural monopoly, where neither economy on scale 
nor the one with aim are applied, and where there are asymmetric activities or 
informations), the levels of inefficiency are often high, sometimes with values 
superior to 50%, and consequently the potential losses are very high, too
21
. 
In addition to all of this, we can also affirm that most of the times inside the 
public enterprises, and so even inside the companies that operate in the water 
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sector, there is a large presence of subjects belonging to politics, and this does 
nothing but highlight the manifestation of opposite interests and the difficulty to 
create reforms for the sector
22
. 
 
Without any doubt though, with the presence of a corporation at an European 
level, we would talk about relevant benefits, for example the creation of a 
common language both for the develop of indicators and methods of data 
collection, plus a common legal picture for the water sector. The effect would be 
to promote national and regional initiatives of benchmarking, to create stricter 
connections among the water users and to augment the competition in the water 
sector
23
. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Italian Case 
 
The cheapness of water services 
 
Industry structures in the water sector vary across the world – in the range of 
activities that individual business undertake, the geographical size and number 
and nature of their customers, the extent of private sector involvement, the scope 
of competition (if any), the nature and extent of regulation, and the bodies upon 
whom responsibility for overseeing and/or implementing that regulation is 
placed. 
In general, the range of activities that water business may undertake include: bulk 
water collection and storage, bulk water transfer, water treatment, bulk water 
distribution, reticulation and retail supply, sewerage collection, distribution and 
treatment, drainage and irrigation.  In many instances, water business is also 
responsible for things like land and resource management, standard setting, 
regulation and policy development.   
The range of activities undertaken by water business is illustrated in figure 6,  
below. 
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Fonte:  Antonio Massarutto, Vania Paccagnan and Elisabetta Linares (2008) ’Private Management and 
Public Finance in the Italian Water Industry: A Marriage of Convenience?’, Water Resources Research 
 
Many factors may influence not only the particular activities an individual water 
business will undertake, but also the manner in which they are undertaken.  
Water supply activities, for example, will depend upon the nature of the water 
sources that are available, e.g. surface water, ground water, and/or manufactured 
water.  
This in turn will influence the technology utilised to ensure that water is treated 
to a suitable quality  (for example aeration, filtration, rapid sand filtration, slow 
sand filtration, ultrafiltration and ion exchange).  Geography, geology and 
topography will also play a role, as well as factors such as customer type, 
demand and density. 
The European Water Framework Directive (WFD)
24
 defines water services in the 
following manner (EU, 2000, article 2, point 38): 
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 The Water Framework Directive is a European Union directive which commits European Union 
member states to achieve good qualitative and quantitative status of all water bodies by 2015. It is a 
framework in the sense that it prescribes steps to reach the common goal rather than adopting the 
more traditional limit value approach. The Directive's aim for 'good status' for all water bodies will not 
be achieved, with 47% of EU water bodies
 
covered by the Directive failing to achieve the aim.   
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“Water services are all services that provide, for households, public institutions 
or any economic activity: (a) abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and 
distribution of surface water or groundwater, (b) wastewater collection and 
treatment facilities which subsequently discharge into surface water.
25” 
 
According to this definition, water services include the economic activities 
necessary to transfer and use water for irrigation, hydropower, drinking water 
supply and sanitation services. The area water supply and sanitation services has 
been henceforth more restrictive. Indeed, it only incorporates services related to 
the supply of drinking water, the collection and treatment of wastewater by 
authorised public or private providers. Water is abstracted by an authorised 
provider from a source (i.e., lake, river, an aquifer), next it is treated and 
transferred pumped into underground pipes, delivered at the premises of 
consumers. The wastewater is then forced into another underground piping 
system, flowing into a sewerage system. As a consequence of the increasing 
scarcity of water and financial resources, water should be managed as an 
economic good, encouraging its conservation and protection. The classical 
economic theory suggests that the integrated water management system could be 
considered as a natural monopoly for its peculiar nature. The integration of the 
primary activities that configure the water management system – water 
abstraction, treatment, adduction, distribution, depuration and wastewater 
collection – raise barriers that impede the entrance into the industry to private 
competitors. These barriers fundamentally emerge as high initial investment 
costs, and very long and not economically acceptable payback periods. The high 
value of sunk costs that are associated to the construction and maintenance of 
infrastructure makes impossible for the competitors to develop their own water 
supply networks. Moreover, the existence of both economies of scale and scope 
that are typical of the integrated water management systems, makes the 
operations of a large number of actors in the same users basin not economically 
viable.  
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Both in developed and under-developed countries the water service industries 
have undergone substantial changes as a consequence of innovative regulatory 
frameworks, a pressure toward a greater liberalisation, and more pressing quality 
standards, all aimed at increasing productivity, enhancing efficiency, achieving 
financial and economical balance, and supporting environmental sustainability. 
Measuring efficiency and searching for more effective organisational and 
business models in the water services sector has henceforth become a major 
concern for policy makers. 
In Italy the water service supply industry has undergone a complex and, 
sometimes, not consistent normative evolution by means of which the national 
legislator attempted to identify a more effective management and organisational 
framework in the changed economical, social and environmental context.  
A water supply system or water supply network is a system of engineered 
hydrologic and hydraulic components which provide water supply. A water 
supply system typically includes: 
1. A drainage basin (see water purification - sources of drinking water). 
2. A raw water collection point (above or below ground) where the water 
accumulates, such as a lake, a river, or groundwater from an underground 
aquifer. Raw water may be transferred using uncovered ground-level 
aqueducts, covered tunnels or underground water pipes to water 
purification facilities. 
3. Water purification facilities. Treated water is transferred using water pipes 
(usually underground). 
4. Water storage facilities such as reservoirs, water tanks, or water towers. 
Smaller water systems may store the water in cisterns or pressure vessels. 
Tall buildings may also need to store water locally in pressure vessels in 
order for the water to reach the upper floors. 
5. Additional water pressurizing components such as pumping stations may 
need to be situated at the outlet of underground or above ground reservoirs 
or cisterns (if gravity flow is impractical). 
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6. A pipe network for distribution of water to the consumers (which may be 
private houses or industrial, commercial or institution establishments) and 
other usage points (such as fire hydrants). 
7. Connections to the sewers (underground pipes, or aboveground ditches in 
some developing countries) are generally found downstream of the water 
consumers, but the sewer system is considered to be a separate system, 
rather than part of the water supply system. 
In order to respect natural water basins and, at  the same time, to avoid the 
fragmentation of the industry and to achieve an adequate operational scale, the 
optimal territorial area (ATO) was assumed as a geographical and administrative 
reference to organise the integrated water supply service. 
 
Over the years, the periodic critical in the water context, in an absolutely general 
economic terms, can be explained by the existence of a growing imbalance 
between demand and supply of water. 
This imbalance has two fundamental reasons: the first consists in the fact that the 
needs required to perform all the various functions, both at domestic level that 
economic exceed the availability of resources offered by nature; the second is 
that the water resources are a natural cycle that is reconstituted in time, but the 
whole thing can be put at risk on a few factors (climate, natural factors, improper 
activities of man). 
The solution to these problems is, of course, the balance between the two 
elements, but the achievement is not as simple as it might appear. 
The available technologies allow, although at high cost, to a satisfactory balance 
among different uses of water, but the problem is that the technologies require 
investments and this in turn implies a willingness to pay by the same users. It is 
therefore necessary to aim at the realisation of connected activities that seek a 
more sustainable use of water, but also in this case problems arise: the 
application of water is not homogeneous, and this is represented by a set of 
heterogeneous and conflicting uses, then the fact that the relationship between 
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supply and demand is not direct, but it is influenced by movements factors such 
as technology, capital, labor; in other words it requires a 'productive' activity. 
The subject user can play directly part of that activity, but otherwise you will 
have to serve of activity of an external subject, to purchase a water service. 
 
The water services sector is characterised by some fundamental specifics: 
 
a. They have to deal with scarce natural resources, in fact such property is 
used for many purposes in the context of today; however, the community 
must ensure these resources over time, and also the reproducing, the 
protection of the natural processes, and it must help them through the 
technology. Upstream of the problem of services is to regulate access to 
the resource; an approach only oriented on the regulation focuses on 
interventions on the supply side, but neglects the opportunities offered by 
demand management. 
b. They are public services, which are characterised, therefore, by 
indivisibility, joint consumption, distribution economies and other aspects 
related to distribution factors or to industrial and environmental policy 
objectives. This means that the demand that the market manifests 
spontaneously is less than what would be optimal for society: institutions 
must be the ones to translate the latent demand into effective, for services 
that the market is unable to manifest fully. 
c. The water sector develops in a natural monopoly (as we shall see later) 
and this does not allow the market to regulate the sector, allowing only the 
most efficient and innovative individuals to withstand the competitive 
drive. It is therefore necessary to intervene to ensure the efficiency and to 
protect consumers against arbitrary monopolists with tools such as pricing 
policies, control of the services' quality, anti-trust legislation, program 
contracts, etc
26
. 
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The sphere of reference partners of a company managing water services is very 
wide; that is mainly because these companies refer not only to the market in the 
narrow sense (customers and users), but they consider all the stakeholders
27
 in 
their work and are able to influence the results. The stakeholders are the subjects 
which the company should refer to, in order to obtain consensus and to legitimise 
its existence. 
The main stakeholders of a water utility can be identified in the customer-users, 
in public opinion, in the institutions, personnel and suppliers.  
Their rights and duties can be summarised in the following figure: 
 
Figure 7: Rights and responsibility of Stakeholders 
 
 
 
Fonte:Canitano G., Montagnani E., Peruzzi P., 2008, L’assetto dei gestori e la concorrenza nel servizio id
rico  integrato, Working paper 02/08, Anea, Roma 
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 Originally the concept of stakeholders was restricted to those who had direct interests in the 
organisation's life; later it widened to encompass all those who can exert influence on business 
decisions. In particular, they can be divided into primary and secondary; The former are intended to 
exert more pressure and direct the business decisions, while the latter influence decisions which in long 
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Customers-users and their representatives, such as consumer associations, are the 
main partners of one water utility. In recent decades it has changed significantly 
the attitude of the users in respect water services: the improvement of social 
conditions and the increase in the levels of information and greater participation 
has also affected this type of users, for which it has grown need to be informed 
and to understand the functioning of the service. Now that the traditional 
passivity has given way to a careful participation, this causes them to make 
judgments on the content and methods of production and provision of water. The 
company communicates daily with the public, especially through the provision of 
the service, forming their own corporate image, in other words the corporate 
representation identified by the community. The analysis and knowledge of the 
satisfaction about the service provided is a fundamental starting point for 
companies, not only to improve the service itself, but also to identify the 
perception of the corporate image in the community. 
 
The unceasing changes that occur in the user expectations require undertakings 
of public services the need for an ongoing study of its target market and, above 
all, the need for a dialogue with its user segments. In fact the companies in the 
water sector are gradually losing the absolute market dominance, both with 
respect to the production and delivery of the service and in relation to the 
exclusive satisfaction of the need. It follows that the market, and therefore the 
users of the service, should be the starting point for every business decision; it 
would be appropriate that the governing bodies demonstrate a high sensitivity to 
changing needs by closely examining every aspect of the trading relationship 
with the reference stakeholders. 
As in a lot of other sectors, water sector included, many companies tend to use a 
segmentation strategy
28
; this is justified, in the first place, by the need to satisfy 
the largest number of user requirements and, secondly, by the need to cope with a 
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competition mechanism even if, at the time, it is only in the initial phase. Thus 
established the need to use the segmentation of the market, the correct test to 
effect it seems to be affecting the type of use of the resource
29
. 
 
It is therefore possible to identify a model that segments consumptions in the 
following way: 
o domestic activities (civil) 
o industrial activity (seasonal and non-seasonal) 
o agriculture (crops and livestock) 
o public activities 
 
The domestic activities are the requirements for drinking or domestic use, and for 
private and public toilets. Accurate analyses are carried out to cope with the 
demand for all day; the latter usually has a variable pattern with spikes in the 
morning hours, central and early evening, and moments of low demand in the 
afternoon and night. 
Although, the demand for water for industrial use is highly variable, because of 
the type of industry and to its production cycle and, then, in relation to each type, 
with reference to the potential, to the type and degree of plant technology , taken 
to water quality, etc. 
In particular, it is possible to identify at least three different modes of use of 
water: for the production needs, for cooling and for washing of the installations. 
This is why the amount of water necessary for the technological process of 
individual companies differs from sector to sector; it follows that the water 
supplied by the water companies should take this into account. In addition, also 
the amount of water resulting from the production process and returned to the 
environment (waste of water) present different characteristics. 
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It is clear that the water used for industrial purposes does not require any water 
treatment process. However, most of the companies in the water sector 
distributes drinking water also to industrial users. It would be remarkable 
convenience to take water to a certain point in the treatment process, and 
eventually, to derive it in special pipelines and then to provide it to industry, but 
this would only be creating a distribution network close to that for civilian use 
and, unfortunately, the initial investment discourages operators. 
 
The water needs in agriculture are affected by many factors of environmental and 
climatic matters, but they are also influenced by irrigation methods, 
technological innovations and the type of culture practiced. The high amount of 
water destined to such use is the result of several factors; in any case it must be 
said that most companies use technologies that have characteristics, like the one 
which allows the reuse of the resource for irrigation purposes. 
 
In the end, public activities represent the needs requested by public facilities or 
public use (schools, churches, municipalities, etc.) for group activities such as the 
cleaning of the streets and the self-consumption related to the management of the 
structure. 
 
The technical-productive activities relating to the complete water cycle are 
realised through activities that require interaction of multiple components such 
as, for example, the labor, the raw material and a complex of systems, like the 
technological one
30
. 
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These activities can be seen as a circular phenomenon: 
 
Figure 8: The phase of SII 
 
Fonte:Canitano G., Montagnani E., Peruzzi P., 2008, L’assetto dei gestori e la concorrenza nel servizio id
rico  integrato, Working paper 02/08, Anea, Roma 
 
Observing the figure it is possible to identify two flows: a flow outward towards 
the market and a return flow from the market. The first can be decomposed into a 
series of phases that follow one another: the caption (water is removed from its 
natural environment), the drinking water (treatment for improvement of the 
qualitative characteristics), storage (regulation of the time of the quantitative 
distribution), the transportation and distribution
31
. 
The return flow regards the wastewater collection, the purification of the same 
and the contribution of the purified water into bodies of water, in order to allow 
the return water in the same circle. 
The different phases related to the cycle require a system of plants and 
technologies more or less complicated, depending on the type of activity. In 
particular, the purification is the most critical step in this direction; but also the 
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different types of use of the resource differs, in terms of plant, including the 
storage and distribution activities. 
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The Organisational Model of the Integrated Water System 
 
The organisational model  provided by l.36 is based on a scheme that can be 
summarised in the figure 9, the Galli law’s Moldel:  
 
 
 
Fonte:Amato A., Conti M., 2005, The economics of the water industry: technology, ownershp and efficie
ncy,  FrancoAngeli, Milano 
 
In short, the fundamental characteristics can be summarised in these points:   
 
a. Ownership of the service:  it is at the head of the local authorities,  
associated inside the  ATO, now called EGATO.  The ownership implies 
the power to decide who can or must be connected to the service, to 
determine their main quality aspects, their territorial extension, their 
infrastructural choices and their financial methods.  
It is exercised over a group of encumbrances generated by the national 
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norms and the regional planning; these encumbrances are about the 
minimum parameters of the service quality, the usable water resources, the 
procedures of restitution of wastewater, in particular as far as the quality 
aspect is concerned; plus the allowed procedures of assurance, the 
obligations of financial coverage and balance and the tariffs' fixation, as 
far as the economy one is concerned. 
 
b. Management of the service: it is entrusted to an independent subject, in 
accordance with what is laid down by the law. The laws about this have 
been through some significant changes during the last fifteen years: from a 
scheme which assured equal dignity to the different management forms, 
even if characterised in an industrial way, we tend to go on towards a 
scheme that, in particular with the dlgs 152/06 and with the Finanziaria in 
2008, subordinates the choice to a procedure with a strong public pattern, 
even if it keeps equal dignity to the different organisational forms 
(concession to private citizens, public/private partnership, state-owned 
enterprise). In any case, there is an agreement between the manager 
subject and the local authorities, that disciplines obligations and rights and 
that represents the main discipline source about the service supply 
procedures and system management. 
Besides, the agreement points out the investment's obligations and the 
dynamics of the future tariffs. 
 
c. Regulation: it is entrusted by a multiplicity of sources that can be 
normative, planning-like, contractual and jurisdictional. Functions of 
discretional regulation turn out to be almost missing, instead; if we do not 
consider some soft regulation activities that the law attributes to 
CO.VI.R.I.'s competence. 
Some regions have established, in their turn, some authorities of 
regulation, yet their tasks are still mostly about soft regulation. 
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So, apparently, the I.36
32
 adopts a delegate-type model, hinged on the functional 
separation between ownership and management, and a regulation centred on the 
contract-instrument. 
The object of the entrustment is the integrated water service (water system, 
sewerage and purification), comprehensive of the investments. 
The service contract represents the main source of obligations for the manager; it 
points out the investments to make and it provides the tariff dynamics, starting 
from the hypothesis contained in the catchment area plan. Actually, behind this 
apparent uniformity, we can recognise all the three types of models that we have 
been referring to in the part I (delegated management, privatised and regulated 
monopoly, direct public management), although there are some peculiar 
specificities and contaminations. 
The model of the "real" delegated management is in the version of the 
entrustment licensed through challenge, and with higher frequency, in the 
variation of public/private partnership with private partner, chosen through 
challenge. Both cases require a long time (30 years or further) since the 
entrustment comprehends the investments, too. 
The contract is extremely meticulous, but also object to frequent renegotiations. 
In a nutshell, all the entrustments realised until now have been modified at least 
once; subject of adjustment have been the operative costs considered in their 
capacity to bull, the basic hypothesis of the plan (sold volumes), the investments 
to make, the tariff of equilibrium.  
The model of the privatised monopoly is found above all in situations where a 
management previously entrusted to public partnerships has been eventually 
transformed through the quotation of part of the capital and/or the entrance of 
non-industrial private partners. 
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There are at least two reasons why we place this scheme in the category of 
privatised monopoly and not in the delegated management one. 
In the first place, many of these companies are also owner of part of the 
networks, to say the least; in second place, although it is just a matter of 
formality that also in this case the entrustment has an end after which a new 
challenge will start, it appears to be strongly on doubt that this would introduce 
real competition perspectives. This is the reason why the impending partnerships 
take a dominant stand, that makes the perspective of a turnover less realistic. 
Contracts have been subject of continual reviews in this case, too. Unlike the 
previous case, however, there are less meticulous contracts, that, generally, allow 
major margins of decisional autonomy to operators, but that, also, point out their 
obligations in a more general way. 
The model of the direct public management is represented essentially by in-house 
partnerships, since at the moment it is not possible a management through 
structures of public right in Italy. 
There is a contract in this case, too; however, the direct control implied in the 
concept of in-house entrustment allows the public subject to modify its contents 
in a certain liberal way, availing of the hierarchic supremacy of the local 
authorities on the partnership. 
In almost all of the cases, it is about very general contracts, that fix obligations 
only for a quite short time, and it is not corresponding to an effective 
enforcement. 
In the last ten years some works, such as the ones carried out by Utilitatis (2008) 
and Anea (Canitano et al., 2007), have analysed, in a comparative way, the 
structure and the procedures of the service contracts' carrying out in the various 
situations. 
 
From these studies, it is deduced: 
 
1. That contracts reflect in an evident way what it has been said above; the 
entrustments to public partnerships (both in the in-house variation, and in 
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the corporate privatisation one) show very vague contents, while the ones 
in private partnerships are much more detailed, with details even about 
operative aspects. 
2. That the contractual review on triennial basis is provided, but not 
disciplined at a national level nor regional. 
3. That very few agreements discipline the reviews (which, besides, raises 
doubts in the light of the European norms about the public/private 
partnerships, that allow the possibility of a review of the agreed terms in 
the challenge only if explicitly provided). 
4. That reviews always concern the whole planning until the maturity. In 
other words, the contract, with a plan concerning the whole duration of the 
contract itself, is entrusted, and the plan itself will be fully renegotiated. 
5. In all cases, there are significant differences, compared to the starting 
background (supplied volumes, operative costs). 
6. Most part of the reviews have implied tariff increases, with a significant 
difference among the direct management, whose increase is quite modest 
and sometimes negative, and the managements entrusted to private 
managers or public/private partnerships, where increases have reached 
consistent values instead (20-30%), except in one case only. 
7. There is a notable difference between planned investments and real 
investments, with an above-average decrease to 40%. 
 
The Optimal Territorial Areas (ATO) provided for by regional regulations for 
reorganizing integrated water services are at present 922; they are all established 
and operational, except one.  In the following table one the main dimensional 
features and association arrangements of existing ATOs are described. 
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Figure 10: Description of each single ATO in Italy 
 
 
As one can see from the table, population and territory of the ATOs can be very 
different: in 5 cases they are the same as the Region’s, in other cases their 
dimensions are smaller than the Province, in some other cases they identify with 
a specific urban aggregate. The average ATO’s population is slightly more than 
600.000.  
 The association arrangements chosen are almost equally divided between the 
two standard types: 48 ATOs have opted for the Consortium between local 
authorities and 43 have chosen the Convention. Generally the Convention is the 
preferred type in the North of the country and the Convention (with the exception 
of the Lazio Region) in the central and southern part. 
 
In the last Report (2008) on the state of water services produced by the 
Committee for the supervision of water resources use (Coviri) gives some data 
on types of service entrusting adopted at present. The situation in 207 shows that 
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67 entrusting agreements have been carried out concerning a population of about 
44 millions. In these 67 areas 106 operators are active, because in some cases the 
service was assigned to several operators. A large majority (64) of entrusted 
operators are public owned companies (in house); slighter numbers (31) occur for 
mixed ownership (public-private) companies, and there are only 5 cases of 
delegation to public limited companies (Coviri, 2008)
33
. 
 
Figure 11: The characteristic of each ATO 
 
 
 
An analysis by geographical area shows that the ATOs that have not yet assigned 
the service are mainly in the North; in the same area direct entrustment to public 
owned companies is predominant. 
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 Six operators cannot be classified in the three types recognized by the D.lgs 267/2000.  
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An Overview of the Italian Water Sector 
 
A recent survey (AEEG
34
 2013) on a sample of 284 water utilities shows that 
Italy has highly heterogeneous service area sizes (see Figure 12). The average 
number of municipalities served by a single firm is 12, highlighting the severe 
fragmentation of the Italian water industry. This is shown in Figure, which 
indicates that  117 out of 284 selected firms operate in an area with fewer than 
5,000 inhabitants. Many firms are still operating on limited hydrological basins. 
Moreover, some municipalities have not yet delegated the management of their 
water services, which furthers the aggregation and corporatization of the Italian 
water sector. The AEEG database indicates that 1,235 independent firms and 
public bodies were involved in Italy’s provision of water services at the end of 
2013. Of these 1,235 operators, 75 % (n. 931) are municipalities or other public 
bodies (such as consortia of local governments or mountain communities) that 
provide one or more water services directly “in house.” As can be seen in second 
Table, the great majority of the local governments that have chosen to provide 
services directly (around 79 %) are located in the north of Italy, mainly in 
Lombardia and Trentino Alto Adige. In some regions (i.e., Basilicata, Friuli, 
Puglia, Sardegna, Umbria, and Veneto), no municipality or public body is 
involved in the provision of water services. In two regions (Molise and Valle 
d’Aosta), water services are provided only by municipalities or some other public 
body, with no water utilities involved in the industry (see second  Table ). 
Moreover, only 232 municipalities or other public bodies.
35
 
 
 
                                      
34
 The Authority for Electricity, Gas and Water System (AEEGSI) after December 24, 2013 was named 
Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG), has the function to promote the development of competitive 
markets in chains Electric, natural gas and Water drinking, mainly through tariff regulation, access to 
networks, the functioning of markets and the protection of end users. 
35
 Guerrini A., Romano G., Water management in Italy: Governance, Performance, and Sustainability. 
Springer, 2014 
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Figure 12: Size of Italian Water Utilities 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Number of inahabitants served by utilities 
 
 
Source: AEEG 
 
Figure 14: Geographical localization of public bodies and water utilities 
providing water services in Italy 
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Source: AEEG 
 
Moreover, only 232 municipalities or other public bodies provide all of the five 
main water services (i.e., the collection, transportation, and distribution of water 
for civil use and sewerage and wastewater treatment), while the others provide 
only one service or some (mainly sewerage and distribution). Thus, only 304 of 
the 1,235 operators are independent firms (water utilities) that were established 
on average in 1991, so they are on average 23 years old, with a maximum of a 
firm that was established in 1852 (Società Acque Potabili, located in Turin). 
Only 160 Italian water utilities provide at the same time the services of 
collection, transportation, and distribution of water for civil use, sewerage, and 
wastewater treatment. These utilities are located mainly in the north of Italy (64 
and 27 % only in Lombardia). These data highlight a complex scenario, where 
there are regions (Basilicata, Puglia, and Sardegna) that have only one or two 
water utilities that manage the water services for the entire regional area, and 
regions (such as Lombardia, Trentino, and Sicilia) with numerous different 
operators. Analyzing financial statements and websites, we find that many Italian 
water utilities provide only the water services (mono-utilities) and are not 
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involved in other industries such as electricity, gas, or municipal waste 
management. Actually, 202 utilities are not involved in other businesses. In 
particular, 25 mono utilities provide only one service (see Table 15), while 108 
firms are the mono utilities that provide at the same time all the main water 
services (collection, adduction/transportation, distribution of water for civil use, 
sewerage, and wastewater treatment). The complexity of the water utilities’ 
vertical integrations and diversification strategies makes it difficult to compare 
firms’ performance and efficiency and reflects the complexity of the endogenous 
and environmental factors affecting decision makers’ definitions of the best 
organizational structure for the water industry. Using the AIDA database, we 
collect information about the number of employees, ownership type, and number 
of shareholders for each of the 304 utilities for 2012. We find that Italian water 
utilities had more than 43,700 employees, with an average of around 160 
employees each, and a maximum of more than 6,500 employees in Hera Spa, the 
biggest Italian multi-utility. The mono-utility with the most employees was Acea 
Ato 2, serving the Roma area, followed by Abbanoa, which provides water 
services to almost all of Sardinia (both with around 1,400 employees).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The specific type of services provided by 25 mono utilities 
 
Source: AEEG 
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Thus, the water sector is very important for the Italian economy in terms of 
employment; Romano and Guerrini (2014) show that Italian publicly owned 
water utilities have significantly more employees than the others do. In addition, 
most of the 304 utilities (53 %) are public firms (whose shareholders are 
municipalities or other public bodies; see Table 2.4); 26 % are totally private 
firms, and the remaining 21 % are mixed-ownership firms with both public and 
private shareholders. These 304 firms (excluding the 15 private partnerships and 
sole proprietorships, 13 co-ops, and 3 listed companies) have an average of 27 
shareholders, with a minimum of one sole shareholder and a maximum of 583. 
The average number of shareholders is higher in private firms, although when 
excluding the firm with the most shareholders, the average is only 18.6, the 
lowest among the three clusters. Moreover, 50 firms have only one shareholder, 
33 of which are public; 90 firms (around 30 %) have no more than three 
shareholders, and only 13 have more than 100. 
 
Figure 16: Clusters of firms on the basis of ownership type 
 
 
Source: AEEG 
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The regulation in Italy 
 
Before 1994, the water service in Italy was characterised by fragmentation, 
ineffectiveness and cost inefficiency
36
. Before the reform dated 1994, the 
operators specialised in the distribution of water, wastewater collection and 
treatment acted on individual stages of very limited functional and geographic 
areas
37
. There were several structural and qualitative deficits connected to the bad 
infrastructures' state. 
Water quality was supplied to a large part of population below the standard set 
by the European Union. In addition, there were large towns (including some of 
the northern Italy) which did not have sufficient wastewater treatment plants. The 
industry (more than 8.000 operators)
38
 was composed of municipalities and a 
small number of privates who received the service concession. Tariffs were set 
by the local authorities themselves at a very low level, reflecting the social 
feature of the service, incompatible with the importance of funding the 
investments necessary to improve infrastructure and provide higher levels of the 
service and consumers protection
39
. The inefficiency of production, the form of 
direct management by the municipalities and the lack of vertical integration were 
reflected on a marked structural gap in terms of technology
40
. A turning point 
towards the management efficiency of the hydro service was due to the Galli 
Law coming into force
41
. 
 
The reform of the Italian water services, which took place after the approval of 
the basic law of the 5th of January 1994, nr. 36, kicked off a process of profound 
transformation of the sector where the main objective was the industrialization of 
the sector, obtainable through an increase in the sizes of enterprises and the 
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  Muraro Gilberto, La faticosa riforma dei servizi idrici,  www.lavoce.info, 13.06.2005 
37
 Coviri 
38
 Coviri 
39
 Paraiso V. The Water supply service in Europe: Austian, British, Dutch, Finnish, German, Italian and 
Romanian Experiences. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 2013  
40
 Massaruto A., La regolazione dei servizi idrici, IEFE Research Report, 2010 
41
 Legge 5 gennaio 1994, n. 36, Disposizioni in materia di risorse idriche, Gazz. Uff. 19 gennaio 1994, n. 
14, S.O. 
56 
 
separation between the activities of planning and coordination and the 
management process.  
So, with the law of the 5th of January 1994 nr. 36 (the Galli Law) all water 
services were the first to be the subject of an innovative and complex discipline 
in the sector. 
This law, in fact, contains all the detailed regulation on use of water, both 
superficial that subterranean, both clean water and wastewater, by defining the 
basic principles for the material, such as the reduction of all phases to obtain, in 
this way, a single integrated management, the reduction of the territorial 
subdivisions of the management, and self-sufficiency of the various processes. 
In addition to this, the reform of the transformation has affected other elements 
attributable  to relevant factors in the administrative service and inside of public 
services in general designed to give further change in the discipline of matter. 
The first transformation factor starts at a community level and looks again at the 
liberalisation initiated by European Union. In fact, the European Commission, 
with some interventions
42
, has advanced a controlled liberalisation of public 
services; in other words, there is an opportunity that private entities could get 
inside of the sector, while establishing alternative measures for the protection of 
the public interest. This phenomenon, in recent years, has not produced a 
comprehensive regulatory regime at the Community level for water services, in 
the strict sense. 
The greatest impact on water services system are the other two factors of 
transformation: the reform of the Title V of the Italian Constitution and the 
overall system reform about the local public services. 
The Constitutional Law of the 18th of October 2001, nr. 3, in fact, has 
completely rewritten the Title V of the Constitution; in particular, this reform has 
greatly increased the power of legislative action of the regions, with the result 
that new areas of regulation have been opened up, and regional authorities will 
need to fill them. 
                                      
42
 Communications of 11/09/1996 and 20/09/2000, entitled "Services of general interest in Europe"; 
Green Paper on Services of General Interest of 21/05/2003.  
57 
 
Now the Galli Law already allows the regional legislative intervention right on 
relevant aspects of the organisation in the integrated water service. However, this 
role could also expand significantly if the regions will take advantage of the 
potential that the Constitutional reform has attributed to them.  
The other factor of transformation is, then, represented by the recent general 
reform of local public services, made possible thanks to the changes introduced 
in the laws contained in T.U. local authorities in article 35, law of the 28th of 
December 2001 nr. 448. 
That article, in fact, has rewritten the general discipline of local public services, 
in an attempt to move the traditional local public sector intervention system in 
economy towards organisational and management models that are able to ensure 
more openness to private markets and, consequently, to limit the role of public 
entity. In addition, in the reform mentioned above there are also some references 
to the organizational aspects of the integrated water services, which are taken 
into consideration in the specific nature of the sector. 
Besides, it is evident that these situations open up new scenarios and future 
prospects for the organisation of water services; this should be said, since the 
first law on the municipalisation of public services
43
, the organisation and 
provision of services related to the use of the waters have always been considered 
typical local public services. 
In all of this, water services as a local public service is also confirmed by the 
Galli Law, with one difference from the past: if the first sector appeared 
composed of a plurality of individual activities that were seen, in each case, as a 
public service, the mentioned law cover allows to identify such activities in a 
single "box " , precisely the integrated water service; in fact, just reading the law 
it is possible to observe the integrated water service as "comprising all the public 
water collection, supply and distribution of water for civil use, sewerage and 
waste water treatment". 
As we understand, the Galli Law contains the rules which identify the 
organization of the integrated water service. However, the object of this law is 
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  Legge 29 marzo 1903, n. 103, c.d. Legge Giolitti. 
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not only the aspect of the management of water service: the Galli Law, in fact, is 
considered a law that sets specific objectives with regard to the general 
phenomenon of the uses of water resources. As specified by the doctrine
44
, there 
are three objectives that the Galli Law pursues: 
a. the rational management of water resources, in ways that reduce waste, 
instead favouring reuse;  
b. the creation of non-fragmented management who has the tools and ability 
to act efficiently;  
c. the redefinition of the economic and tariff aspects, so as to allow new 
entrants to managers to act in a commercial manner.  
 
It is evident, then, that the specific rules for the integrated water services are not 
a discipline for its own sake but, as we can assume, they are functional to the 
realisation of the objectives set out above and, in the first place, to the protection 
of water resources purposes that the law wants to achieve. 
Therefore, the provisions of Chapter II of the Galli Law appear as the main 
organisational model through which assures, in a perspective of protection, the 
use of water resources: 
 Compliance with the criteria of solidarity which inspire any use of the 
water (art. 1, paragraph 1); 
 The protection of expectations and the rights of future generations to 
benefit from an intact environmental heritage (art. 1, paragraph 2); 
 Saving and renewal of water resources (art. 1, paragraph 3); 
 The priority exploitation of the resource for human consumption (art. 2, 
paragraph 1). 
 
However, the realisation of these objectives is not only required for the 
intervention system by local authorities: the Galli Law, in fact, is also involved in 
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order to redesign the distribution of functions and tasks in the field of water 
among different public bodies involved. 
That is the reason why the article 4 of the Galli Law recognises at governmental 
power a series of tasks which in fact confirms the state's role in the water sector. 
In particular, these are tasks and functions that mainly concern the address and 
programming, establishment of standards, criteria and minimum essential levels, 
the collection and processing of reference data, control and supervision of the 
sector. 
As for the state, the Galli Act also provides for the regions a role in planning and 
programming, but next to this important role and responsibility, regions have 
other functions relating primarily at organizational point of view, because they 
have the responsibility of defining the optimal regional environments (the so-
called Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali). They also regulate the forms and 
collaboration tools among local authorities and draw up a convention type and a 
specification with regard to relations between local authorities involved and 
subject managers of integrated water services to incorporate the framework, in 
order to control the discharge of civil settlements and production connected to 
the public sewer. 
Finally, the Galli Law assigns to the local authorities the specific task of 
providing about the reorganisation of water service, in accordance with criteria: 
a. Dimensional 
b. Management 
Regarding the size criteria, article 8 of the law, it requires the necessary 
reorganization of water services on the basis of a larger geographical area than 
the municipal, said precisely optimal regional environment (Ambito Territoriale 
Ottimale). In addition, the law also intervenes to determine the criteria which 
must inspire the initiative to reorganise eventual environmental, functional and 
institutional principles.  
The dimensional criterion can be also observed in another way: the Galli Law, in 
fact, requires the establishment by members of the local authorities of an 
adequate optimal regional environment authorities; at this aim, it is a region to 
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regulate the forms and ways of cooperation to which local authorities, who are in 
the same area, must use to exercise the political and administrative functions of 
the integrated water service governance. 
As regards to the management criteria, these are mentioned in the moment in 
which in the Galli Law it has been established that the water service is seen as a 
unitary intervention, in place of previous and autonomous uptake activity, 
adduction and distribution of water, and sewerage and wastewater treatment (art. 
8, paragraph 1, lett. b). 
The management organisation of this service is the responsibility of local 
authorities, as the task mandatory to be exercised at the same time also for the 
organisation of the integrated water service, from the local authorities for which 
the law establishes specific criteria. 
First, the management of the service must be organised in a way to ensure 
efficiency, effectiveness and the economy of the activity (art. 9, paragraph 1)
45
. 
Second, the law reveals only the business model that companies that want to 
satisfy the integrated water service are obliged to follow. So, here are the five 
models in reference: 
 
1. The management in economy 
2. The special company 
3. The institution 
4. The concession to third parties 
5. The mixed company 
 
In the end, the Galli Law defines certain organisational rules that have the 
objective to make the passage from the old to the new management system less 
damaging. 
Indeed, article 9 paragraph 4 of the Galli Law describes the possibility to waive 
the activities in the unitary management of integrated water services, in order to 
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  The specification of these criteria has been dedicated Annex 7 of the Directive P.C.M. March 4, 1996 
that generically describes what should be the characteristics of a management inspired by the criteria of 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy. 
61 
 
preserve the forms and the management capacity of the existing organisations on 
the condition that those organisations are meant to respond about the criteria of 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy. In these cases, therefore, the local 
authorities concerned may carry out the integrated management of water service 
also with multiple parties managers, with the need to proceed to identification of 
the entity, which is to entrust the responsibles of service coordination to adopt all 
the other appropriate measures to ensure the integration of functions between the 
plurality of operators.  
Another characteristic of the Galli Law for the reorganisation of the water sector 
is the new tariff regulations; this is based on the principle of covering costs. 
That tariff should be calculated on the quality of the water resource and the 
service provided, the cost of ownership, return on invested capital, etc. The 
choice of the tariff's level is responsibility of the individual subjects that develop 
the service but ,next to that, the law considers the elaboration of a method for the 
formation of a standard tariff, on the basis of cost components; to conduct this, it 
is the Ministry of Public Works, in agreement with the Ministry of Environment. 
In addition to this, the law involves the introduction of a price cap, which is a 
contractual mechanism where, in the periodic redefinition of tariffs, sets a limit 
to increase in tariffs by reducing planned costs; this allows to achieve a double 
object: on one hand, it enhances the consumers not to increase too much the tariff 
and on the other one, the companies can achieve a level of quality service and 
efficiency higher than before. 
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From the figure 17 it is possible to see the sector pre and post-reform: 
 
Pre-reform Post-reform 
Responsibility of the municipalities, 
which have the right to voluntarily 
create consortia 
The responsibility of municipalities, 
which are associated compulsorily 
in  ATO. Some existing management 
can be saved but if effective and 
efficient 
Approximately 13,500 managers About 90 managers of the SII 
Prevalence of direct public 
management, economics or through 
municipal companies or consortia 
Organized management in an 
industrial way, with the obligation 
for municipalities to delegate to 
specific entities 
Tariffs regulated at national level Tariffs following a standard model 
and is based on price.cap 
Planned investments by regional 
and financed through public budget 
Self-financed investments with tariff 
Responsibility for investment 
separated from the managerial 
Responsibility for investment and 
management 
Risks borne by the public finance economic risks borne by the 
management 
 
Source: Review of Massarato A.,  Privati dell’ acqua? Tra bene comune e mercati, il Mulino, Bologna 
(2010) 
 
From the figure above,  it is possible to realise that the Galli Law is one of the 
fundamental points for the Italian water sector, being finalized to reconstruction 
and industrialization of the sector.  
To sum-up, the important points of the reform are:  
 
63 
 
a. The territorial integration, possible with the definition of local Optimum 
Areas of Operation (ATO); 
b. Overcoming management fragmentation, using the integrated water 
system (SII); 
c. The separation of the control functions and business office, through the 
creation of institutions of areas (the so-called enti d'ambito) and the 
concession of the service to a company; moreover, the elimination of 
direct management by the municipalities, non-functional for the service;  
d. The reform of the tariff system with the introduction of the price cap in 
order to ensure efficiency and quality; 
e. The establishment of an independent Body of Supervision, the Committee 
for the Supervision on use of water resources (CO.Vi.R.I.). 
 
The reform of the water service has encountered many problems of 
implementation. 
First, the creation of each area was very complicated, because of issues that were 
raised in relation to the administrative borders as well as the hydrographic ones, 
which attributed more effective legislation; the definition of the investment plan 
and the tariff scheme from the local authority subtracted the general discretion to 
the managers of the factories. 
In all of this, the regional laws were very contradictory and object of reservations 
by local authorities. The transition period had (almost) never been done in the 
best way and the desired simplification of procedures gave the green light to the 
formation of norms, but they made the situation even more complicated. 
In the moment the Galli Law has implemented, Italy was trying to affirm the 
competition in the market
46
. This forecast has not found a full wording in the 
Galli Law, since the forms of attribution of the service have been postponed to 
the general rules of the relationship among local authorities and have been object 
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 For competition "in the market" means the free competition between all operators in the sector; 
competition "for" the market is still about a competition, but accomplished through a competition 
between several operators, and it has specific procedures announced by 'Authority owner of the 
service'. 
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of public service operators; according to which, also the direct award to special 
companies or public shareholders can be used to grant third parties
47
. 
It is clear then that the entrustment of the management has been a troubled and 
criticised path with various changes and amendments. For example, if we 
consider that the separation of ownership and control have advantages in terms of 
management, but it raises issues in relation to the behaviour of the monopoly 
against of the community. 
After eight years since the approval of the Galli Law, the investigations 
conducted by the CO.Vi.R.I. showed that the reform was not complete: in the 91 
ATO identified, only 74 had been built with a population coverage of 44 million 
inhabitants. Only 59% of these had realised the recognition of the systems and 
the network's state.
48
 
Among the 19 regions that they had decided to adhere, 5 had defined that the 
ATO coincides with provincial boundaries, 5 had very similar borders to the 
regions themselves and 2 had chosen a policy of communal aggregation. 
Thanks to this investigation the government decided to intervene again with new 
regulations and decrees, among them: the Ministerial Decree of the 22nd of 
November 2001, the mode of concession to third parties about the management 
of the integrated water service management and the approval of the local public 
services (art. 35 of law, 28th of December 2001 nr. 448, the Budget Law of 
2002)
49
.  
For the first time it is possible, by the Ministerial Decree, to assign the 
concession for the management of water services to subjects that are not part of 
the public administration. In any case, however, parameters had been established, 
in fact the very elastic standards refer to the experience in the sector and the 
average turnover in the two previous years. 
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In relation to the experience, the regulator required that the competitor had not 
managed in the past the entire integrated water service but only individual 
segments
50
 of it and that their customers served in the past were much less. 
 
The reform introduced by the Galli Law was carried out with delays and gaps.  
Article 22 of the law 142/90
51
 (which takes over the art. 113 of Legislative 
Decree 267/200011) establishes three possible forms of service management:  
• concessions to third parties; 
• by a special company;  
• by a company with more public capital. 
 
According to the provisions of art. 113, c. 5 of Legislative Decree no. 267/2012, 
referred to art. 150 of  Legislative Decree no. 152/2006
52
 the integrated water 
service entrusting can be mainly through: 
a) concession to a private part by tender; 
b) direct award to a public-private society by SpA with a public evidence 
procedure for the selection of the private partner;  
c) entrusting or delegation "in house" to companies with wholly public 
capital. The in-house entrusting is introduced with the Law Decree 
269/200314. 
                                                           
Legislative Decree dated April the 3rd, 2006 redefines the public integrated 
water service sustaining that, in such a territorial area, one company manages 
water distribution, sewerage and wastewater treatment in an efficient, effective 
and economic way. In this period there is a push towards the public control of 
water, which would take place through the elimination of the tender and a 
possible return to management in the economy. On the other hand there are 
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people opting for the "privatisation" of the industry. However, the tax decree 
related to the 2008 Budget  provides "a moratorium on water." By this measure, 
all the pressure towards privatisation is defeated. The "moratorium" involves the 
suspension of credit to the private management of water services and the tenders 
suspension.  Ronchi Decree dated September the 25th, 2009 defines new 
normative and management aspects: the water management is entrusted through 
public tenders and companies having private partner with participation being 
lower than 40%; the in-house trust is allowed in an exceptional way.  The law of 
March the 26th, 2010 decrees the ATO abolition. 
Referendum dated 2011, June the 13th abolishes the prospective of trust for 
public local services of economic relevance in general and it cancels the new 
proposed method of tariff determination in the water industry. Next, the planning 
and control of the management of the integrated water service became the 
Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG)'s scope. AEEG 
furthermore has the purpose of defining and monitoring a reliable and transparent 
tariff system. In the future Italian sector other normative changes will be surely 
on move. To determine the water quality is different in the various parts of Italy 
because of the better or worse infrastructures status. Network losses are higher in 
the South than in the North of the country
53
. 
The largest voices of revenues and operative costs respectively concern water 
distribution, service and labour costs
54
. 
 
Another fundamental aspect of regulation appears to be the tariff policy. One 
solution may be the use of standard costs, theoretical costs calculated for all basic 
operations that constitute the service. For example, the standard cost could be 
calculated on the basis of the ones incurred by the enterprise more efficient, 
forcing the other to calculate its tariffs by using this cost, or, as another option, 
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you could use a standard value of the average cost, obtained from different 
companies operating in similar conditions
55
. 
This method has the disadvantage of requiring a very detailed regulation, through 
the rigid fixation of the average rates and, primarily, to identify a price 
differentiation. 
Alternatively, you can think of more elastic forms, leaving companies free to set 
their tariffs within overall
56
 limitations. 
One aspect of this mechanism is provided by the so-called price-cap; a method 
based on the negotiation of the increase's margin in tariffs and on the basis of the 
cost of production inputs' inflation rate, in a way that the achievable productivity 
gains and it is possible to make investments. Below the cap of increment rate 
defined by contract, firms may be free to allocate the tariff independently, also by 
practicing price discrimination among different categories of consumers. 
In the case of water services, it should be noted that the two methods described 
above are not able to manifest themselves in the best way. 
In fact, the standard cost method requires a precise knowledge of the cost of the 
service function, but this is virtually impossible in a strongly differentiated 
framework, due to user needs and the quality of resources available. It is not, 
therefore, easy to define a standard cost on the basis of the output, that is, a cost 
representative of the amount of processing that the operator will have to make on 
the raw material, while it will be possible to define the standards only on the 
basis of the inputs, with reference only to the individual ones used. 
If the price cap, the theory suggests that it is a mechanism suitable for sectors 
where we do not care much about the level or quality of investments, but it is 
rather about a service already developed, whose future performance is 
predictable with a safety margin; while the water services are requiring specific 
investments and live dynamic phases with changing demand. 
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In Italy the drinking water tariff has been, so far, decided from the State, 
pursuing the general and social purposes rather than taking into account the 
actual costs incurred for the management of the service. This is due to the 
predominantly social public service attributed to the distribution of drinking 
water and the consequent need to apply a political price, or even to create a free 
distribution
57
. 
The law of the 5th of January 1994, nr. 36, in redefining the sector of water has 
established a pricing system to ensure the full coverage of investment and 
operating costs, including amortisation and financial charges. 
In particular, it has provided a public regulation of rates, imposing the 'drawn up' 
centrally in a specific tariff method, which will then be used as guidance to 
decide the reference tariff of each area agency (the so-called autorità di ambito). 
 
This method is based on the following expression 
 
Tn = (C+A+R)n-1 (1+ỻ+K) 
where: 
 
Tn= value of the tariff in the current year 
C= Operative Cost of last year 
A= amortization of last year 
R= return on invested capital 
ỻ= inflation rate 
K= maximum price the operator can implement (price-cap) 
 
These two elements only are determined by the national government and they 
contain the tariffs, which have had significant increases in the last five years, yet 
they are not sufficient to finance in full the investments planned. 
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The final cost of water contributes to the canons for sewerage and purification, 
which previously were largely set at the maximum allowed by the CIPE
58
, but 
now it accounts for unequal measure from ATO to ATO and for the concession 
fee that not everyone apply. 
In the end, considering that the tariffs applied previously were very different 
from one management, the result is an extreme variability of the tariffs applied 
today. 
To get an idea of this variability, it is enough to look at the following table, 
which lists the ten cities where the water service is more expensive (left) and the 
ten where it is less in Italy (right).  
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CHAPTER 3 
The Portuguese Case 
 
Market Structure of Water Sector in Portugal 
 
The water sector of a determined country is a vital part of its development and 
quality of life. In 2010, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared that 
the access to potable water and to a proper wastewater system were vital rights in 
order for individuals to have quality of life and to enjoy all the other basic human 
rights. This clearly illustrates the importance of this sector for a country, and for 
the life of all populations. Given this importance, these services are usually 
labelled as strategic public goods, with economic interest.  
In Portugal, the law
59
 defines water services as essential public services.  Like all 
public goods, managing a water system is a complex task. The water services, as 
a public good, must fulfil the requirement of universality in terms of distribution, 
at reasonable prices and rates, respecting the socio-economical paradigm of the 
country, since it possesses an important status in terms of social balance. 
Furthermore, this sector naturally creates monopoly power, and is considered as 
capital intensive, with long maturities in terms of return on investment, which 
adds even more speciality to its management. 
In Portugal, this sector witnessed a big expansion in the last couple of decades, 
imposed mostly by the EU Directives on water supply and sanitation, with many 
of the management entities having resources that match the excellence levels of 
other European countries. This expansion has been coordinated by domestic 
strategic plans for the sector, such as the PEAASAR II
60
, occurring from 2007 to 
2013.In the beginning of the 90s, the water system reached 80% of the 
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Portuguese population, and in 2011 those figures reached the level of 95%. In 
terms of water quality, in the year of 1993, only 50% of the water available in the 
system was considered safe for consumption, whereas in 2011 that percentage 
reached 98%. In terms of the wastewater system, the coverage reaches 81% for 
the drainage of residual waters and 78% in the treatment of those same waters
61
. 
 
The water sector in Portugal comprises three different sub-sectors. These sub-
sectors are the distribution of water to the public, the wastewater system, and also 
the waste management services. All three of the sub-sectors have a chain of 
processes. These processes are divided into the “upstream” and “downstream” 
stages. The upstream stages are correspondent to the wholesaler or bulk, being 
the downstream stages correspondent to the retailer.  
 
The stages are the following:  
Drinking water supply service to domestic households
62
:  
 Upstream – Groundwater abstraction, treatment, elevation, adduction  
Downstream – Storage, distribution, consumption   
Wastewater management service from domestic households:  
 Downstream – Discharge, drainage, retention Upstream – Elevation, 
transport, treatment, rejection  
Solid waste management services from domestic households:  
 Downstream – Waste production, Municipal waste collection / Separate 
collection  Upstream – Organic recovery/recycling, incineration, landfill 
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It is possible to see that in the drinking water supply services the upstream phases 
comprise the steps going from the extraction until the public network, being the 
downstream stages responsible for storage and distribution to the individual 
households.   
In the wastewater management service, the downstream stages are correspondent 
to the collection of wastewater from the general public until the transfer to 
appropriate facilities. In these facilities, the water is treated and given a proper 
destination.  
All the services mentioned above are organized regarding the entity that is 
responsible for managing them.   In fact, a multiplicity of agents coexists on the 
Portuguese water sector, in order to assure a continuous provision of water and 
complementary services.  At a more broad level we have the Central 
Administration, or government branches, together with the regulatory agency – 
ERSAR. ERSAR - The Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority, is in 
charge of regulating public water supply services, urban wastewater management 
services and municipal waste management services. 
These activities are essential public services, but consumers do not have the 
possibility to choose between operators due to the lack of competition in the 
water and waste sector. Therefore, protecting the consumers is one of ERSAR’s 
main missions. ERSAR established its own regulation model and regulates over 
500 operators. 
These agencies are responsible for legislation and regulation of the sector. In 
terms of management of the water system, municipalities play a big role, together 
with municipal associations and municipal and intermunicipal companies. In 
Portugal, municipalities are responsible for the management of the water 
services, and also for its concession, if that is the local decision. 
Also in the management level of the water infrastructure, other companies exist. 
Public companies sometimes are awarded with the concession, but there are also 
private partners in charge in some municipalities. The law allowed the entrance 
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of private partners on the capital structure of water distribution companies in 
1993. The presence of private players occurs mainly on the downstream part of 
the water sector. The upstream faction of water collection is usually awarded to 
public companies, but still there are some exceptions, as Águas da Serra (owned 
by AGS, a private group), Águas do Vouga or Tratave (both controlled by 
Aquapor). The downstream market is easier to enter for private parties. Upstream 
facilities are even more demanding in terms of capital than downstream, which 
creates additional entry barriers. Additionally, upstream companies are 
responsible for serving several downstream companies and consequently a large 
costumer basis. Given this, the regulatory system itself imposes limitations for 
private participation at this level, since it’s easier to control and regulate the 
system while holding the upstream sector. One extra factor for a less open 
upstream sector compared to the downstream sector is that to enter in the 
downstream distribution, companies have to negotiate with municipalities, which 
have the power to attribute the governance of local water management. For the 
upstream sector, it is a different scenario, since a lot of municipalities are 
involved, and the negotiation would have to pass through the state holding 
company Águas de Portugal. 
On the urban waste sector, the upstream faction is more dispersed in terms of 
ownership. Associations created by groups of municipalities own several of the 
local companies. Nevertheless, recently it was announced that EGF, a sub-
holding company from Águas de Portugal for the management of the urban waste 
sector, has been sold to a private consortium, indicating an additional opening for 
private parties on the sector.  This brief introduction about the players in the 
water sector provides a good panorama about the difficulties of managing such a 
complex and fundamental service. Amongst the several management entities 
there are enormous differences in scale, resources but also management system. 
This heterogeneity brings several issues in terms of management and regulation.   
In Portugal the Responsibility of water services is shared between the State 
(central government) and Municipalities. The state is responsible for the multi-
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municipal level systems (services Wholesale),  while the municipality only for 
those at the municipal level (Services to detail). 
 
Operators responsible for the provision of services can choose between these 
three different management models: Direct management, delegation and Grant.  
Moreover, they  can promote public-public and public-private cooperation. The 
state and municipalities may require participation of private companies 
Management of water services through Different Models: 
 
a. minority interest in the equity of multi-municipal concessions; 
b. minority interest in the equity of municipal companies, inter-municipal or 
subways; 
c. concession from the municipality to third parties (public or private). 
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Figure 17: Management model of water factory in Portugal 
 
Source:Luìs‐Manso P., 2007, Reform and Risk Management in the Urban Water Sector: the 
role of  Regulation, CDM.  Lausanne, EPFL 
 
The first two models are an institutional collaboration, this collaboration is 
realized through a joint company for the provision of public services, while the 
final solution is a contractual (the partnership is based solely on a report of the 
contractual type). 
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The water service system was reformed in 1993, following a strategy that in part 
has the traits of resemblance to the Italian case. At the base of the reform, in fact, 
is the strategy to reorganize the service to local areas over municipal, exceeding 
the management fragmentation, and with the ambition to reach an allocation of 
more homogeneous services and together promote the modernization of the 
management system and the degree of economic self-sufficiency. 
Water and Wastewater service (WWS) ownership and management has mainly 
been associated with the public sector. Although in the past the largest operating 
companies were private operators, the assets still belonged to the state or to the 
municipalities. There was no private management in the water sector in Portugal 
between 1974 and 1993. From 1993 onwards there was a proliferation of private 
sector participation, which, in 2006, covered almost 20% of the total population. 
Apart from this, there has been an accentuated growth in juridical-formal 
privatization (public utilities governed by private law). 
The municipalities are responsible for providing the WWS. They can do so 
directly, by means of municipal services (which are directly managed by 
municipal bodies and do not have administrative of financial autonomy), or 
through sem-autonomous utilities (which are administratively and financially 
autonomous and are managed by their responsibilities to parishes or to municipal 
companies, seeking, in the case of the latter, a greater level of entrepreneurship 
and a clear option for private law. WWs activities can also be attributed to 
private operators, by means of concession arrangements. An analysis of operators 
at the level of parishes, which are quite significant numerically, reveals that 
presently in Portugal water services are supplied by 300 and wastewater services 
by 305 operators
63
.  
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Figure 18: The difference between the Water and WasteWater service 
 
Source: R. C. Maques (2010), Regulation of water and wastewater service, IWA publishing. 
 
In Portugal, the WWS has witnessed extremely important developments in the 
past two decades. The diverse legal landmarks that have been established, the 
organizational changes and, above all, the heavy investments that have been have 
resulted in a significant increase in WWS coverage, so much so that, in general, 
these services are currently supplied with a high level of quality. The excellent 
drinking water quality supplied to customers likewise reflects the success of this 
evolution. Apart from this, the large participation of stakeholders in 
recommendations and the technical credibility and reputation of operators for 
being free from political factors, especially considering their institutional 
vulnerability, are also factors that have contributed towards the national and 
international recognition of the vast  operational and regulatory progress that has 
characterized the water sector in Portugal.  
It must be mentioned, however, that Portugal still faces important challenges in 
this area, namely the need to expand the regulatory model to all the WWS in 
Portugal, the fact that, despite significant efforts, operators are frequently not 
self-sustaining, the need for operators to improve their productive efficiency, the 
clarification of the role of the State in the water sector and the separation of the 
regulatory functions from operational functions and, finally, and improvement of 
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the existing legislation governing this sector, which, in some case, is outdate and, 
in other instances, is still limited in the context of the new requirements.  
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80 
 
Water Sector PPPs in Portugal 
 
There is no clear consensus on what constitutes a public-private partnership 
(PPP). The organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE)
64
 
defines a public-private partnership as an agreement between the government and 
one or more private partners (which may include the operators and the financers) 
according to which the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that 
the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment 
depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners. PPPs fill a space 
between traditionally procured government projects and full privatization. PPPs 
are thus an alternative to public sector traditional procurement, where the 
Government specifies the design of the infrastructure, calls for bids and pays to a 
private-sector contractor for the construction of the facility, and once the 
construction is finished, the asset is transferred back and operated by the 
government . 
 PPPs also differ from full privatization, where the difference lies in the 
transferred risk. Privatization involves no strict alignment of objectives since it 
usually means that the government is not involved in the output specification of 
the privatized entity to pursue maximum profit. In a privatization all risks are 
transferred to the private subject. 
Over the last  years Portugal has undergone a major infrastructure investment 
program in many different areas. After the integration in the EU (and the 
following access to large capital funds), one of the country’s priorities became to 
decrease the infrastructure deficit that was always regarded as a cause for lacking 
economic growth. In areas such as the highway construction, hospital 
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construction and management, the water sector, energy (electricity and gas) 
supply, the preferred procurement option for developing this investment plan was 
the PPP model. 
 Between the late 90s and early 2000s there was an intense period of PPP 
development in Portugal. However the lack of past experience and legislative 
framework together with the necessity of infrastructures and the absence of 
relevant costs during the first years of the contract has contributed to excessive 
PPPs, badly designed contracts and underestimation of future costs. After almost 
a decade, the prevailing challenge was how to bear the costs of the PPPs. 
 Almost another decade later, this challenge was consummated in a massive 
public finances crisis to which PPPs obligations contributed significantly.  
Specific legislation to regulate Public Private Partnerships was only launched in 
2003, designing a common framework for all PPP projects, namely, the design 
and preparation of tender procedures, contract awarding and monitoring. The 
projects signed before the approval of this legislative package did not have any 
guidelines regarding risk sharing and renegotiations. The lack of specific 
legislation and also of a public body able to deal with the complexity of PPP 
projects resulted in the absence of accountability. The rationale for developing 
PPP arrangements was to allow the public sector to extract value from a profit 
oriented approach and design a financing scheme that would relieve the financial 
effort of investing in large sunk infrastructures. Experience suggested that the 
former was the main motive for PPP development, although most of the value of 
a PPP model relies on the ability to have a private management, profit-oriented, 
able to develop efficient solutions. The use of the PPP model as a financing 
scheme led to when governments were launching a project, there was no legal 
instrument to incorporate the annual rents for the duration of the contract into a 
“public balance sheet”65. The annual payment was a long term concern, and was 
not accounted conveniently. 
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 After the 2008 financial crisis, private capital lenders became less available to 
assume risks and the national debt crisis has forced the government to reduce 
public investment. As a result a lot of PPP projects were postponed or cancelled. 
The difficulties however do not concern only the inability to launch future 
projects but also the payment of existing rents. Around these years a massive 
financial effort on the Portuguese government part was demanded. Considering 
the projects launched, for the global contracting period of 2008 and 2050, the 
annual average burden would be 1,122 million Euros, with a peak above 2,000 
million Euros in the period between 2014 and 2019. These projects place 
Portugal as the largest PPP user in Europe, weighted by Gross Domestic 
Product
66
 . In 2011, with the financial assistance program under the auspices of 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund the so called “Troika”67, Portugal was immediately asked in the 
signed memorandum of understanding
68
 to take three different measures with 
respect to PPPs:  
1. halt all new contracts; 
2. assess existing ones, 
3. renegotiate all contingent obligations arising from old contracts. These 
measures somewhat attenuated current and future financial impacts with 
PPPs in particular with the highway concessions.  
The water sector is composed of the water supply services (which includes all the 
activities involved in supplying water to the population in both urban and rural 
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areas) and wastewater treatment (which includes all the activities related to the 
collection, treatment and final destiny of the waste products). These services are 
considered essential to the citizens wellbeing, public health, economic activity 
and environmental protection. As a result they have to follow certain principles 
that include universality of access, service quality, efficiency and price equality 
(ERSAR, 2015). The market structure associated with the water sector is a 
natural monopoly due to the high entrance costs associated with construction 
investments as well as the high maintenance costs. Due to the public nature of the 
service, the water system is mainly managed by the government . 
 In Portugal, the water sector was solely managed by the public sector until 1993. 
In that year legislation changes occurred that allowed the access of the private 
parties to this sector, which was previously forbidden. More specifically it 
allowed the concession of the exploration and management of the water systems 
to private companies. 
 
 The PPP model is very relevant in the water sector, covering:  
-  50% of the population in water supply services (“wholesale category”); 
-  18.19% of the population in water supply services (“retail category”); 
- 70% of the population  in residual water treatment services (“wholesale 
category); 
- 19% of the population in residual water treatment services (“retail 
category”)69.  
 
Due to poor procurement legislation, these original PPPs are characterized by 
bad planning and procedures. There is no proper analysis of the risk involved and 
the subsequent allocation; there is no calculation of the Public Sector Comparator 
and there are no second negotiation rounds to improve the contractual conditions. 
Furthermore the procurement rules do not allow the proper comparison of 
proposals and as result donot allow the best options to be chosen. Overall PPPs 
are not driven by Value for Money which ends up creating badly designed 
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contracts that affect negatively the municipalities. The major factors that 
contribute to the inefficiency of the PPP procedure in water sector are: Lack of 
competition in the water sector market, inefficient and lack of performance 
monitoring of the contracts, small dimension of the majority of the municipalities 
and  poor sector legislation.   
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Institutional and regulatory framework 
 
In Portugal, the wholesale (bulk) and retail (end-user) activities in Water and 
wastewater service (WWS) are formally split, being fashioned respectively into 
regional and municipal system. The role of the state, as a significant operator 
through state-owned companies, and ERSAR (the Portuguese acronym for Water 
and Waste Services Regulation Authority), as a sector-specific regulatory 
agency, are key institutional features.  
ERSAR is guided by the principles of competence, fairness, impartiality and 
transparency, comprehensively considering the technical, financial, legal, 
environmental, public health and social ethics, which should characterize the 
water and waste services. 
ERSAR intends to protect consumers’ rights and to ensure the economic 
sustainability of the municipal and regional water and waste utilities. This way, 
ERSAR aims to promote regulation as a modern tool for State intervention in 
these essential economic activities, with a view to setting high performance 
standards and defending public interest. 
Regulation has as main objective the protection of users’ and consumers’ 
interests by promoting the quality of service provided by operators and ensuring 
socially acceptable pricing, since water and waste services must have the 
following characteristics: essentialness, indispensability, universal access, equity, 
reliability and cost-efficiency associated with the quality of service. 
However, this should be done considering the financial viability and the 
legitimate interests of the operators, regardless of the responsibility for its 
provision or management model, and also considering the promotion of the rest 
of the economic sector, through the reinforcement of the business framework 
while also contributing to the application of the policies defined by the 
government. 
Owing to difficulties in answering the new challenges that followed the entry to 
the EU, the Portuguese Government reorganized the sector. The resulting 
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reforms had important goals: one of such goals was to keep the responsibility for 
the water distribution and wastewater collection within the municipalities, 
assigning to the state further investments in bulk activities through the creation of 
multimunicipal systems to be managed in a business-like fashion.  
Currently, the system’s owner is legally allowed to choose the service 
management form in multiple way. In state-owned systems, the possibility relies, 
mainly, on concessions to state owned public companies. These companies can 
be either 100% owned by the central state, or a partnership with proper minor 
equity owners (the central state still has the majority of shares), as municipalities 
(public-Public partnership, PuP) and private investors (Public-Private 
Partnership, iPPP), whenever adequate, under proper legal procedures. In order 
to steer and control those corporations, a state-owned national champion was 
created, the holding Aguas de Portugal (AdP).  
As for the municipal system (municipally owned, mainly the retail segment), the 
number of possibilities increase. If a municipality  choose to produce the service 
itself, it can use a municipal department or create a structure with some degree of 
financial and administrative autonomy. Municipal or public companies, or local 
companies, owned by local government are also possible options.  
The PuP concept can also be adapted her, in this case designated as a 
state/municipalities are also able to select private partners as equity owner 
(iPPP), generally being the municipalities the retainers of the dominant influence. 
Concession arrangements with private enterprises, are also a possibility, trhough 
proper public tenders.  
As those reforms took place, it became imperative to monitor and supervise such 
procedures. Hence, a regulatory agency (IRAR) was set up in 1998 to regulate 
multimunicipal and municipal concessions. However, nowadays the regulatory 
model has broader regulatory competences and, since 2009, it covers a wider 
range of activities for all delivery models. The authority currently designates as 
ERSAR is a public institute endowed with administrative and financial autonomy 
and, until recently, was subject to the influence of the Ministry for the 
Environment. 
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 Its main regulatory activities include three important fields:  
1. structural regualation 
2. regulation of operators behaviour 
3. public disclosure of sound information and technical support.  
Due to water and wastewater services inherent characteristics, the quality of 
service and economic subfields are paramount regulatory activities. Since 2009, 
and effective as of 2011, ERSAR regulates all delivery models; however this 
development requires an increased maturity. In practice, an improved compliance 
and standardization in reporting is need, mainly by in-house models, related to 
the information requested by ERSAR, in order to enable prompt and efficient 
analyses, enhancing the regulatory procedure.      Furthermore, this “universally 
applied” economic regulation is still at an initial phase, the system owner holds 
too much discretion in tariff related issues, in several cases undermining service 
sustainability (the municipal in- house models are such cases).  
Despite its important regulatory activity and the attempt to provide a culture of 
reliable and information for all, ERSAR still bears a limited coercive power, as 
the ability to impose sanctions has been quite narrow. Besides, the regulator 
provides evidence of a very weak regulatory governance with lack of 
independence, accountability and responsiveness and has the president with 
longest term in the world. Since ERSAR is a toothless regulator, it obeys and has 
been captured by all the governments, irrespective of their political orientation.  
The peculiar way in which the system is organized with the division between the 
market "high" and "low", but also the coexistence of public and private entities 
requires a flexible operation mode and differentiated in different situations. 
Infact, from the point of view of the regulation, a characteristic of the Portuguese 
system is the presence of a couple of national regulators, respectively competent 
for environmental aspects and water policy (INAG) and economic regulation 
(IRAR). Both operating through mandates of the central government and do not 
have the powers of independent authorities, but rather support the real regulators 
and their acts, the responsibility of the state, maintaining an independent and 
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autonomous power only with regard to the technical regulations, quality 
standards etc. 
The IRAR plays a key pivotal role, with very large economic regulation skills. 
The reasons behind the decision to set up IRAR essentially rests in recognition of 
the substantial ineffectiveness of competitive mechanisms in attributing 
concessions and nature essentially monopolistic industry. 
The IRAR skills can be summarized as follows: 
1. Consulting to the central government for the acts of its competence 
(strategic planning, rafting the sectoral legislation), at the special request 
or on its own initiative; 
2. Adjusting of utilities: analyzing and expression of opinions for M & A, 
verification of compliance with contractual and legal commitments, 
economic and tariff regulation, regulatory accounting, quality of service, 
benchmarking; 
3. Consumer protection: complaint management, public information; 
4. Institutional Reporting, technical support, development of reference 
standards, operational guidelines. 
With the Decree Law 277/2009 IRAR is transformed into ERSAR (body control 
of aqueduct and waste water management). The institution regulates water 
services, waste management and water quality. This regulatory action extends 
responsibilities and field of expertise in the management model. 
The tasks of ERSAR consist of the following three elements: 
a. Structural adjustment (design of a national strategy and improvement 
of 
rules that govern the sector); 
b. adjustment of the conduct of the operators (service quality, economic 
adjustment, 
water quality control); 
c. regulatory support activities (such as technical support to operators 
for the collection, validation and processing of comparable). 
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See you then, as the transition from IRAR to ERSAR expanded economic 
regulation entire sector (IRAR covered only concessions). 
Another fundamental aspect that is discussed in the Portuguese regulation is the 
tariff; despite the approval of the rates continue to be the responsibility of 
municipalities for the majority of retail operators, as of mid-2011 was asked 
everyone to submit tariff proposals for approval to ERSAR non-binding. This 
new forecast along with ERSAR Recommendation provide clear guidance in 
determining the tariffs. 
 
Figure 20: The function of ERSAR 
 
 
 
Source: Ersar 
 
The procedure for fixing the tariffs is expected that a rolling year each utility 
must present its budget for the next regulatory period and a proposed tariff 
adjustment. The proposal is analyzed in adversarial ERSAR and business, only to 
be finally approved by a ministerial decree. During the ERASR work carries out 
random checks to evaluate the correspondence between predictions and what 
actually made; at the end of the period ERSAR draw up an evaluation that will 
• contribution to the formulation of a national 
strategy for the sector 
• contibution for improve to the rules and laws 
structural 
regulation of 
the sector 
• Controllo legale e contrattuale 
• Regolazione economica 
• Regolazione sulla qualità del servizio e delle acqua 
regulation about 
the conduct of 
operators 
• Collection, processing and publication of the 
relevant information 
• innovations and support to operators 
Additional 
regulatory 
activities 
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serve as a basis for negotiating the rate in the following period. Only direct 
management in economics escape this mechanism and set rates without directly  
ERSAR intervention. The regulation system is thus cost-based; the only incentive 
mechanism operates so soft and corresponds to the results of the comparative 
analysis carried out systematically by ERSAR. 
The intervention of ERSAR for the supervision and control of tariff is expressed 
in the application of three main references, containing guidelines for the tariff 
structure and billing: 
 
• Recomendação IRAR 1/2009; is intended to harmonize the tariff 
structure providing for a 
fixed fee and a variable fee (progressive) and provides that operators must 
not introduce additional component respect to the tariff; 
• Recomendação ERSAR 1/2010; It concerns the harmonization and 
transparency of invoices 
send users;  
• Recomendação ERSAR 2/2010 ; It regards the protection of consumers 
and cost recovery, 
entailing the presentation of the costs and revenues of the different 
specific services separately to avoid cross-subsidization
70
 but foreseeing 
the possibility of applying special rates for certain categories of users (for 
example low income levels). 
 
The annual reporting is based on codified procedures. ERSAR defines a set of 
indicators that each operator is obligated to detect and communicate to the 
controller; It shall arrange the drawing of comparisons comparative and 
assessments that are published annually. In this regard, however, it must say that 
                                      
70
 The fixing of tariffs below the level of costs in a market and the coverage of losses that I get are 
covered with cash revenue generated in another market. 
Sometimes journalists talk about cross-subsidies when there are differences in applied mark-ups, but such 
price differentiation may reflect different elasticity of demand, so that all consumers will help to cover the 
costs common. 
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ERSAR has no power to impose direct sanctions, which belong rather to the 
municipal authorities or the state, depending on the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The model Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
Efficiency Measurement Concepts 
 
As the goal of this thesis is to evaluate efficiency of expenditure, we need to 
explain what the term efficiency means. 
What is efficiency? The efficiency is a feature recognized to a production process 
when there is not any other allowing to produce at least a better output at the 
same input factor, or allowing to obtain the same output with the least use of at 
least one input. Farrell, in 1957, introduced the concept of frontiers "best 
practices" and the first measures of efficiency. In the economic literature 
“productive efficiency” of a company means:  
 
a. the correspondence between the output produced and the maximum 
potential output, given the technology and the combination of input 
(“output oriented”);  
b. the correspondence between the amount of input actually used and the 
minimum amount of potentially usable input, given the technology and the 
output level (“input oriented”).  
From a theoretical point of view when you are faced with a situation where there 
is not a correspondence between the amount of current and potential good 
amount it is necessary to explain the causes of this difference. It may in fact be 
due to the technique or allocative inefficiencies. The allocative efficiency is 
achieved when the combination of inputs is such as to minimize the cost of 
production, for a given level of output, or such as to maximize the output, for a 
given level of total cost; these points are on the cost frontier. The technical 
93 
 
efficiency occurs, however, when there is not an excessive use of both factors 
and the company gets the maximum output given a certain combination of input, 
when producing on the production possibility frontier. In both cases, the measure 
of the efficiency varies between 0 and 1: efficient production is shown by the 
unit. If an economic unit operates on the border, is technically efficient
71
.  
Efficiency is one of the three basic economic principles that are used to evaluate 
expenditure. The other two principles are economy and effectiveness. Together 
they are also known as three E.  
As these terms often get confused, we will now explain also the remaining two.  
The economy could be see as evaluation criterion from the perspective of cost (or 
in general inputs) minimization; efficiency as evaluation criterion from the 
perspective of maximization of ratio between outcomes and costs, and 
effectiveness as evaluation criterion from perspective of rate to which the desired 
outcomes are being fulfilled.  
 
The figure might help us. 
 
Figure 21: The concepts of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
 
The terminology of efficiency, obtaining the most consumer satisfaction from 
available resources, can be traced back in the production system. Thus, the 
concept of efficiency can be amply understood through a production frontier. A 
production frontier is a graphical representation of a production function that 
shows how much output can be produced given the various combinations of 
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 Coelli, T.J., Rao, D.S.P. and Battese, G.E. (1998) An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 
Kluwer, Boston. 
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factors of production
72
. Thus, a production function is extensively used to 
delineate the relationship that exists between inputs and outputs by illustrating 
graphically the maximum output obtainable from the given inputs consumed.  
 
The Figure below depicts a Production Possibility Frontier (PPF); Figure 22.  
 
 
Source: Coelli, T., Prasada Rao, D. S. and Battese, G. E. (1998), “An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity  Analysis”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston 
 
 
The blue coloured curve in this Figure above shows the PPF of output (Y) with 
various combinations of input (X). Thus, this simply implies that all the points on 
or below the PPF (A, B and C) are attainable whereas point D is unattainable as it 
is beyond the PPF. In as far as efficiency is concerned; production at point C is 
regarded as inefficient given that it is situated below the PPF. This may be due to 
inability of a firm operating at point C in utilising its resources optimally to 
produce given output. In other words, a firm with an output at point C is not 
producing as much output as it could with the same amount of input. In contrast, 
                                      
72
 Factors of production in this case refer to the inputs to the production process. 
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points A and B are efficient as they are located on the PPF and that means they 
are producing the maximum possible output with the given input.  
In short, not only does any point on the PPF show how efficient firms are but it is 
also a reference point for the inefficient firms. Therefore, a measurement to 
calculate efficiency is the distance between the observed production and the 
frontier production. However, Greene (1997) asserts that “producers are efficient 
if they have produced as much as possible with the inputs they have essentially 
employed and if they have produced that output at minimum cost”. Echoing in 
the same line, Worthington and Dollery (2000) in Porcelli (2009) argue that 
efficiency is only one part of the whole performance of the firm. 
They add on saying that the measurement of effectiveness and the degree to 
which a system achieves programmes and policy objectives as regards to 
outcomes, quality, accessibility and appropriateness, complete the performance 
of the firm.  
This is illustrated in Figure where the distinction between efficiency and 
effectiveness is clearly portrayed.  
 
Figure 22:  The difference between Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
Source: Coelli, T., Prasada Rao, D. S. and Battese, G. E. (1998), “An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston 
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In the literature the efficiency of a firm can be classified into allocative and 
technical efficiencies, which are then combined to provide total economic 
efficiency (EE)
73
. 
Technical efficiency (TE) refers to the firm’s ability to obtain maximum output 
given an  
optimal combination of inputs with reference to a production function. Charnes,  
defined TE “as the ratio between the observed output and the maximum output, 
under the assumption of fixed input, or, alternatively, as the ratio between the 
observed input and the minimum input under the assumption of fixed output”74.  
Inversely, Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) described the following technical 
efficiency measure, like “one minus the maximum equi-proportionate reduction 
in all inputs that still allows the production of given outputs, a value of one 
indicates technical efficiency and a score less than unity indicates the severity of 
technical inefficiency"
75
. 
 
Allocative (or price) efficiency (AE) denotes the firm’s capability in utilising the 
inputs in optimum proportions as regards to their respective prices. Thus, AE 
refers to the ability of the decision making unit through use of cost minimising 
input ratios in order to produce a given level of output.  
In this way, we can see the allocative efficiency like “the ability to combine 
inputs and outputs in ideal proportions in the light of prevailing prices, and is 
measured in terms of behavioural goal of the production unit, for instance, 
observed versus optimum cost or observed profit against optimum profit”.  
Thus, this measure quantifies how near a firm is to using the optimal 
combination of production units when the goal is maximum profit.  
Allocative efficiency exists when the resources are best allocated by a firm 
according to production necessities and market prices.  
                                      
73
 The term total economic efficiency (EE) will be used in this study instead of ‘overall efficiency’. This 
terminology however is not been used in the recent efficiency literature as much as it used to be.   
74
 Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., and Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the eﬃciency of decision-making units. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6):429–444 
75
 Farrell, M.J.  (1957).  The measurement of productive efficiency.  Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Series A, 120(3).  253-290 
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Farrell (1957) also based his ideas on two main approaches that measure both 
allocative and technical efficiencies: 
 
a. Input approach: This is whereby the ability to minimise inputs while 
keeping outputs fixed is evaluated. Thus, in this way waste is avoided 
through producing as much output as input usage allows.  
 
b. Output approach: This is the opposite of input approach as outputs are 
maximised while keeping inputs fixed which then enables waste 
avoidance due to using as little input as output production allows.  
The input-oriented efficiency measure discussed above addresses the question: 
“How much can inputs be proportionally reduced while maintaining the same 
level of output?” 
The analogous question could be: “How much can outputs be proportionally 
increased while keepingthe level of inputs constant?” 
This question is addressed by an output-oriented efficiency measure and as one 
can see from this aforesaid question, it is different from input-oriented measure. 
 
The following diagram describes this concept of input oriented model by an 
example of two inputs and one output firm.  
The X1 and X2 are inputs and Y is the output of the firm. The QQ’ represents the 
isoquant that is also the most efficient relative production combination (i.e. 
efficient production function). Isoquant is the set of all points that are 
combination of inputs that produce the same amount of a specified output. Here 
it is assumed to be q, and is assumed to be one. 
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Figure 23: The Input oriented 
 
 
 
Source: Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., Lewin, A. Y. and Seiford, L. M. (1994), “Data Envelopment 
Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Applications”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
 
The efficient production function is defined in such a way that all the firms lie to 
the northeast of the isoquant.  
 
Firm P utilizes x1 and x2 units of inputs X1 and X2 respectively to produce an 
output of quantity q. For the firm P to perform efficiently, it should use x1' and 
x2' units of inputs respectively to produce the same quantity q of the output Y. In 
other words, the firm P would have been operating efficiently, if it uses x1 and x2 
units of the inputs to produce q units of the output Y. 
Based on the former discussion, where the inputs are minimized holding the 
output constant, the technical efficiency of the firm P is given as OP'/OP.  This 
means that the two inputs can be reduced by a proportion equal to OP'/OP. 
Reducing input X1 by a proportion OP'/OP from x1 means to bring it down to x1' 
units. A similar proportionate reduction is done for the input X2 to reduce it from 
x2 to x2'. 
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In addition to the technical efficiency that is based on the best practices, the cost 
of the inputs should also be considered to determine the overall performance of 
the unit under investigation since the costs of an input is different from that of the 
others. The line CC' is the isocost line representing the various combinations of 
the two inputs that have the same total cost c. The slope of the isocost line is 
determined by the ratio of the costs. The isocost line CC' is tangential to the 
isoquant QQ' at point A. This firm that is represented by the point A would have 
the best technical and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency portrays the 
ability of the firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions so that the resource 
cost is minimized. Firm P' which is also the projection of firm P onto the 
isoquant QQ' is also as technically efficient as firm A, but is not as allocatively 
efficient as A. This is because, the cost of production at point P' would be the 
cost associated with the isocost line C1/C1', which is c1. From our initial set up 
of this example, the cost c1 is higher than the cost c. The allocative efficiency of 
the firms P and P' is the ratio OP'/OP. 
 
The total economic efficiency of the firm P is defined as the ratio OP''/OP 
((Farrell 1957). This ratio is defined as follows   
  
OP''/OP = OP''/OP' x OP'/OP 
 
 That is:  
  
Total economic efficiency = Allocative efficiency x Technical efficiency. 
 
 
The output oriented models look at the extent to which the outputs produced can 
be increased without an increase in the inputs and hence is known as the output-
increasing measure of technical efficiency. This can be illustrated using Figure. 
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It is an example firm that produces two outputs with one input. Y1 and Y2 are 
the outputs and X is the Input. 
 
Figure 24: The Output oriented 
 
 
Source: Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., Lewin, A. Y. and Seiford, L. M. (1994), “Data Envelopment 
Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Applications”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
QQ' is the isoquant that represents a constant quantity of input that is used to 
produce varying proportions of the two outputs. It is concave to the origin and 
since it determines the best production possibility, all the firms lie to the left and 
the bottom of QQ'. A is one such firm. Point B is the projection of the firm A into 
the isoquant QQ'. Here the distance AB determines the amount of technical 
inefficiency. Hence the output-oriented technical efficiency measure is given by 
OA/OB. If the prices of the outputs are also known, then the isorevenue line RR' 
can be drawn and the allocative efficiency can also be determined as OB/OD. 
Then the overall efficiency would be the product of the two efficiencies and 
would be the ratio OA/OD. 
 
Now that the concept of efficiency has been discussed, it is useful to show how it 
can be estimated. In general, two types of efficiency estimators can be used. The 
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first approach is data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the second is stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). 
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What is the DEA model? 
 
The technical efficiency measures the way that a firm chooses the quantity of 
inputs that is used in the production process when the factors use propositions are 
given. The technical efficiency which evaluates the way the firm chooses the 
ratio of the different inputs compared to the market price that is supposed 
competitive. The economic efficiency is determined by the combination of the 
technical efficiency with the allocative efficiency. It refers to the concepts of 
productivity, performance, quality and profit on the one hand, and of the 
reduction of the total strength employed and of the costs on the other hand. The 
concept of economic efficiency will be associated to the criterion of value. Thus, 
any change inclined to increase the value is considered as an effective change 
and inefficient in the contrary.  
 
For this reasons efficiency is, in any case, an element that can be calculated by 
the companies. Over the years many authors are interested in developing new and 
efficient methods to identify an appropriate solution. 
A brief review of the efficiency analysis methods is provided in Figure: 
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Figure 25: The methods for the calculation of efficiency 
 
 
As basically displayed, empirical methods to estimate economic efficiency refers 
to parametric or not parametric approaches. Parametric method has a parametric 
form in the cost/production frontier and they are classified into deterministic 
methods (COLS) and stochastic techniques (SFA). Deterministic technique 
(COLS) assumes a deterministic element for its frontier functional form, whereas 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) has a stochastic element in its frontier 
function. Within Stochastic frontier analysis for Panel Data according to the 
specific necessity it is possible to choose between these methods: fixed Effects 
Model, GLS, MLE, True Random Effects. Non parametric approaches are 
instead divided into Data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull 
(FDH).   
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A correct specification of the model is therefore a key element in the econometric 
efficiency analysis. This step becomes particular in the water sector, 
characterized by a lack of technical and environmental homogeneity. The 
industries covering the entire water cycle (water supply, transport and 
distribution, water treatment) are internally characterized by different levels of 
specialization and vertical integration, and are particularly subjected to the 
influence of external environmental factors. Every company has therefore a 
particular structure of operating costs, for which a single model hardly provides 
an estimate being perfectly valid for all elements of the sample considered.   
 
The non-parametric techniques do not assume any form of the production 
function. Instead, Norman and Stoker (1991) assert that it is from observed 
inputs and outputs that a best practice function is formed empirically. With this 
kind of approach, all deviations from the efficient frontier are assessed as 
inefficiencies. Nevertheless, the parametric statistical estimation approach 
accepts the fact that the deviation has noise and inefficiency components.  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and its alternative variant, the Free Disposal 
Hull (FDH), are the two most widely used non-parametric approaches. However, 
since this study focuses on DEA only, FDH will not be discussed in this paper. 
The other reason for choosing DEA over FDH is due to the fact that by far DEA 
is the most widely used between these two aforesaid approaches in the technical 
efficiency literature regardless of the sector being analysed.  
 
Charnes et al., (1978) were the first authors to coin the term DEA in the 
efficiency literature.  
DEA is a linear programming based non-parametric technique in measuring 
efficiency.  
Relative to the frontier of best performance, DEA measures the efficiency of a 
Decision Making Unit (DMU)
76
 by its position.   
                                      
76
 Charnes et al., (1978) first used the term ‘Decision Making Unit’ (DMU) in order to determine the units 
of which relative efficiency scores are calculated by DEA. 
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A DMU is a unit of analysis such as a state, a section of pavement, a factory, a 
unit inside the factory, a transit agency or business unit. DEA produces a single 
comprehensive score for each DMU, which is the ratio of the weighted outputs to 
the weighted inputs. The specific weights for each DMU are determined to 
maximize the score. Consequently, each individual DMU receives the highest 
score possible and the argument of using different weights is not valid when 
comparing final scores. 
 The final output of DEA is a ranked efficiency score for each DMU, which is 
determined using the following equation:  
 
Efficiency= 
                        
                       
 
 
Production efficiency with DEA can essentially be defined as how well a specific 
DMU is able to function or operate based on its given constraints and 
characteristics. 
The basic DEA model for “n‟ DMUs with “m‟ inputs and “s‟ outputs was first 
proposed by A. Charnes. The model determines the relative efficiency score for 
the different DMUs. The model depends on maximizing a production function 
estimated by DEA. This function is a deterministic frontier. For any inputs, the 
value of the DEA estimate defines the maximum output producible from inputs 
under all circumstances. On the other hand, for any outputs, the value of the DEA 
estimate defines the minimum input producing a given output under all 
circumstances. In this sense, it is comparable to the parametric frontier with one 
sided deviations estimated using mathematical programming methods. 
 
The definition of relative efficiency forms is the basis of data envelopment 
analysis.  The relative efficiency is typically represented in the following 
mathematical form: 
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Nj=
       
 
   
   
 
 
 
Where: 
Nj= relative efficiency of unit j 
Ui=weight on output r 
Vi=weight in input i 
Yrj= quantity of output r for unit j 
Xij= quantity of input i for unit j 
 
n number of firms with m number of inputs and s number of outputs are 
considered here. Xij represents the inputs and Yrj represents the outputs of firm j. 
 
Mathematically, DEA is a linear programming procedure for a frontier analysis 
of inputs and outputs. DEA assigns a score of 1 to a unit only when comparisons 
with other relevant units do not provide evidence of inefficiency in the use of any 
input or output. DEA assigns an efficiency score less than one to (relatively) 
inefficient units. A score lesser than one means that a linear combination of other 
units from the sample could produce the same vector of outputs, using a smaller 
vector of inputs. The score reflects the radial distance from the estimated 
production frontier to the DMU under consideration. 
The study of efﬁciency can be oriented to inputs or outputs. The difference lies in 
whether the objective is to continue producing the same outputs with minimum 
inputs (input-oriented models) or if the objective is to maximize outputs using 
the minimum amount of inputs (output-oriented models).  
In simple terms DEA indicates the IeveI of resources savings and/or services 
improvements possible for each inefficient unit if it is to achieve the lever of 
efficiency of the best practice unit. 
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The DEA model can be classified as having either constant returns to scale 
(CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). Under CRS models the outputs are not 
affected by the size of the DMU, rather they change in direct proportion to the 
change in inputs assuming that the scale of operation does not influence 
efficiency; therefore, in the CRS models the output and input oriented measures 
of efficiency are equal. Under VRS models, changes in outputs are not 
necessarily proportional to the changes in the inputs; therefore in the VRS 
models the output and input oriented measures of efficiency scores are not equal 
for inefficient units.  
 
The ﬁrst DEA model was developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. 
This model, known as the CCR model
77
, assumes constant returns to scale. This 
means that for a decision making unit (DMU) using an input X to produce an 
output Y, it is feasible to produce αY using αX amount of input (where α is a 
variable). To measure the relative efﬁciency of a DMU0 based on a series of n 
DMUs (where n is the total number of units under study), the model is structured 
as a linear programming problem as follows: 
Maximizeu,v: 
 
       
 
   
   
 
 
subject to: 
       
 
   
   
<1   j=1,2,.....n  and u,v >0 
 
where n is the number of DMUs in the comparison, s the number of outputs, m 
the number of inputs, ur the weighting of input yr in the comparison, vi the 
weighting of input xi, and yrj and xij represent the values of the outputs and inputs 
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 A. Charnes, W. Cooper, A. Lewin, L. Seiford "Data Envelopment Analysis - Theory, Methodology and 
Applications" 
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Yr and Xi for DMUj, respectively. In reality, the solution is found by solving the 
dual problem as shown in the following equation: 
 
 
Minimize θ,Ω: 
θ 
 
Subject to: 
-yi + YΩ >0 
Θxi - XΩ >0 
Ω >0 
 
Where θ  represents the efﬁciency and, hence, the percentage of radial reduction 
to which each of the inputs is subjected, Ω>0 is a vector of n elements 
representing the inﬂuence of each DMU in determining the efﬁciency of DMU0, 
Y is the vector of DMUo outputs under study and X is the vector of inputs for this 
same DMU0.  
The CCR model assumes that all the DMUs operate on an optimum scale with 
constant returns to scale. It is rare, however, for markets to function in an ideal 
way. There will always be ﬁnancial limitations or imperfect markets where 
increased amounts of inputs do not increase proportionally to the amount of 
outputs.  
In order to account for this effect, Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) developed 
the DEA model for variable returns to scale (BCC). The figure shows the 
difference between the CCR and the BCC models for a simple case where one 
input (x) is used to produce a single output (y). In this example, the CCR frontier 
uses a single point so that only one DMU is efﬁcient. In contrast, the BCC model 
provides three efﬁcient solutions that will deﬁne the curve of optimum 
production while adapting better to real market conditions. 
 
 
109 
 
 
 
Figure 26: The CCR and BCC model 
 
Source: Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., Lewin, A. Y. and Seiford, L. M. (1994), “Data Envelopment 
Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Applications”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
 
In the CCR model, it is proposed that the efficiency of any DMU can be obtained 
as the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the 
condition that similar ratios for every DMU are less  
than or alike to one.  
To obtain the efficiency of all DMU, it is necessary to solve a series of linear 
program, one for each DMU as the objective function. 
DEA identifies the most efficient units and indicates the inefficient units in 
which real efficiency improvement is possible.  
The amount of resources saving or services improvement that can be  
achieved by each inefficient unit to make them efficient is identified and can be 
used as indications for management action.  
 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper in 1984 introduced the BCC model in which the 
envelopment surface is variable returns to scale. The CCR model is employed to 
estimate the overall technical and scale efficiency of a DMU.  
However, the BCC model takes into account the possibility that the most 
productive scale size may not be attainable for a DMU which is operating at 
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another scale size. It estimates the pure technical efficiency of a DMU at the 
given scale size of operation. 
 
The DEA model can be classified as having either constant returns to scale 
(CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). Under CRS models the outputs are not 
affected by the size of the DMU, rather they change in direct proportion to the 
change in inputs assuming that the scale of operation does not influence 
efficiency; therefore, in the CRS models the output and input oriented measures 
of efficiency are equal. Under VRS models, changes in outputs are not 
necessarily proportional to the changes in the inputs; therefore In the VRS 
models the output and input oriented measures of efficiency scores are not equal 
for inefficient units.  
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Advantages and Disadvantages of Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a very powerful service management and 
benchmarking technique originally developed by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) to evaluate private and public sector organizations. DEA has since been 
proven to locate ways to improve service not visible with other techniques. 
Why is DEA, a method that can generate new paths to improved profits not used 
when other less powerful techniques continue in use? 
 
Every service organization can benefit from DEA in different ways and DEA can 
be adapted to help improve service productivity. Increased use by service 
managers will identify new strengths and benefits that can be derived from DEA 
along with gaps and weaknesses. The latter can set the agenda for future research 
on adapting DEA and will help identify areas where this methodology is 
inappropriate and ineffective, allowing managers to identify these types of 
applications of DEA. Linear programming is the underlying methodology that 
makes DEA particularly powerful compared with alternative productivity 
management tools. DEA has been widely studied, used and analyzed by 
academics that understand linear programming.  Managers have not widely 
adopted DEA to improve organization performance, in part, because most DEA 
publications are in academic journals or books requiring the ability to understand 
linear programming and supporting mathematical notation. In fact, some 
managers trying to use DEA based on their understanding of academic 
publications have misunderstood the way to apply DEA. They erroneously 
attribute weak results to the technique when the problem is often due to the 
misapplication of DEA. 
 
What does DEA do?  
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a. DEA compares service units considering all resources used and services 
provided, and identifies the most efficient units or best practice units 
(branches, departments, individuals) and the inefficient units in which real 
efficiency improvements are possible. This is achieved by comparing the 
mix and volume of services provided and the resources used by each unit 
compared with those of all the other units. In short, DBA is a very 
powerful benchmarking technique. 
b. DEA calculates the amount and type of cost and resource savings that can 
be achieved by making each inefficient unit as efficient as the most 
efficient - best practice units. 
c. Specific changes in the inefficient service units are   identified, which 
management can implement to achieve potential savings located with 
DEA. These changes would make the efficient units performance 
approach the best practice unit performance. In addition, DEA estimates 
the amount of additional service an inefficient unit can provide without 
the need to use additional resources. 
d. Management receives information about performance of service units that 
can be used to help transfer system and managerial expertise from better-
managed, relatively efficient units to the inefficient ones. This has resulted 
in improving the productivity of the inefficient units, reducing operating 
costs and increasing profitability
78
. 
The above four types of DEA information prove extremely valuable because they 
identify relationships not identifiable with alternative techniques that are 
commonly used in service organizations. As a result, improvements to operations 
extend beyond any performance improvements management may have achieved 
using other techniques. 
 
In general, when considering the efficiency of a machine cm be determined by 
comparing its actual output to its engineering specifications. However, when we 
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consider service organizations, we generally do not know what the optimum 
efficiency is and therefore we cannot determine whether a service unit is 
absolutely efficient. DEA enables us to compare several service units with each 
other and determine their relative efficiency. 
 
In contrast to regression methods, DEA focuses on individual observations and 
optimizes the performance measure of each DMU. A priori knowledge of 
weights or prices for inputs and outputs is not required in DEA; however, 
managerial judgment can be accommodated when desired. 
 
Researchers preferring to estimate efficiency using Stochastic frontier estimation 
to DEA, because this approach: 1) sensitivity to data errors, and 2) the fact that it 
assesses relative, and not absolute, efficiency. 
DEA is not only non-parametric but is also a deterministic approach to assessing 
efficiency; as such it makes no allowance for the possibility of random errors in 
the data. Because efficiency is estimated relative to other institutions being 
evaluated, outliers in the data may alter the shape of the best practice frontier and 
distort the efficiency scores of institutions using similar input/output proportions. 
Mettas, Vargas and Whybark (2001), for example, have shown that DEA 
efficiency scores can be highly sensitive to data errors. 
 
A second, closely related issue arises from the fact that DEA constructs a frontier 
from the data itself. 
Hence, the efficiency measures derived in any given analysis are only valid in as 
much as they reflecthow efficient DMUs are, relative to other in that particular 
sample.  
Consider the scenarios outlined in the figure, which is an input-space map for a 
population of firms (the whole of which is represented by stars, circles, and 
triangles) producing a single output using two inputs
79
. 
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In the first case, the researcher performs a DEA analysis on the entire population 
with the constructed frontier graphically represented by the line marked “A.” 
Now assume the researcher instead draws a random sample of firms (or selects a 
particular sample for another reason), resulting in the construction of the frontier 
represented in Figure by line “B.” It is clear from the figure that when the entire 
population was considered, firm R was not found to be efficient but is efficient in 
the new sample.  
At the same time, firm Q is shown to be efficient in both instances. Had the 
researcher chosen, randomly or otherwise, another sample of firms, the results 
would again likely differ, as shown by the frontier marked “C” that evaluates 
only those firms depicted as stars. 
 
 
Figure 27: The demonstration of efficiency 
 
 
Source: Mettas, R.D., Vargas, V.A., & Whybark, D.C. (2001). An investigation of the sensitivity of DEA 
to data errors. National Research Council. (1993). Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States. 
 
 
What this example demonstrates is two important ways in which DEA results 
change with the selection of decision-making units to be evaluated. First the 
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shape of the constructed isoquant may change depending on characteristics of 
firms in the sample. Second, as was discussed above, firms deemed efficient 
relative to one group may in fact be inefficient when compared to another. The 
main point ,however, to be taken away from this discussion is that computing 
efficiency in this way is that it is not possible to develop measures of Absolute 
efficiency. Even if the entire population of some group of firms was analyzed, 
one cannot say that the constructed frontier represents the absolute minimum 
input usage possible in the production of the outputs specified
80
. 
 
Efficiency estimates in DEA are based on the behavior of other institutions; as a 
result there is no need to drawassumptions about efficiency a priori. 
The efficiency identified is directly observable since other institutions have 
already demonstrated higher levels of efficiency can be achieved. Second, the 
danger of imposing incorrect assumptions on the model is mitigated because the 
non-parametric nature of DEA means only very few assumptions are imposed on 
the underlying technology. 
 
Finally, DEA is widely lauded for its ability to estimate efficiency where firms 
use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs and the underlying production 
relationship is not well understood. Whereas an SFE cost function can only 
consider one expenditure category at a time (i.e. a single-valued dependent 
variable), in DEA it is possible to examine how multiple expenditure 
categories are likely to influence cost efficiency
81
. 
 
What one sees then is that the advantages to using either approach tend to rectify 
the disadvantages in the other. Shortcomings of the DEA approach, like only 
being able to assess relative efficiency or being highly sensitive to data errors, 
are the primary reasons why some researchers prefer using SFE. 
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At the same time, limitations imposed by having to use a single-valued 
dependent variable or the need for assumptions about the nature of efficiency in 
SFE are easily handled using DEA and widely considered one of the strongest 
attributes of the approach. In both cases more sophisticated estimation techniques 
are continuously being put forth and their eventual adoption will be the only true 
test of their success. In the meantime, it is just as necessary to consider what 
these estimation methods cannot tell us as what they can
82
. 
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Literature review about DEA 
 
Since 1970s, studies have been conducted to assess and compare the performance 
of and of Water Supply Service (WSS) using both (1) accounting methods and 
(2) econometric and operational research methods. Among the former ones, 
researchers have applied key performance indicators and ﬁnancial ratio (e.g. 
Guerrini et al 2011; Hassanein and Khalifa 2007; Reynaud and Thomas 2013; 
Shaoul 1996; Tsagarakis 2013; Tynan and Kingdom 2002; Yepes and Dianderas 
1996). Econometric and operational research techniques include the use of 
regression analysis for the estimation of the cost function or operational research 
techniques based on frontier models, such as SFA and DEA. Although there are 
diﬀerence between methods based on regression analysis and DEA, some 
economist highlighted that both techniques are potentially useful tools for 
comparative eﬃciency analysis in the regulated water industry. Moreover, the 
application of both the DEA models and parametric frontiers (SFA) seems to 
provide very similar results (Bhattacharyya et al. 1995; Seroa da Motta and 
Moreira 2006). Recently an interesting research which have focused on Italian 
ATOs argued that the application of SFA instead of DEA allow a better control 
for heterogeneity of exogenous variables aﬀecting the performance. However, as 
it will be explained later an innovative manner to control for heterogeneity might 
be to combine the ﬂexibility of DEA assumption with cluster analysis. 
The current study applies DEA to estimate the WSS utilities eﬃciency. As 
pointed out by Bogetoft and Otto (2011), the selection of a benchmarking 
approach should reﬂect and respect the characteristics of the industry (p. 19). 
With particular reference to the WSS industry, De Witte and Marques (2010) 
argue that the lack of knowledge on the production function in this industry can 
justify the application of DEA. Indeed, this method is considered more ﬂexible, 
than parametric approaches, and is able to adapt its mean structure (shape) to 
data. DEA does not require any assumption regarding the functional relationship 
between costs and outputs. Moreover, Bogetoft (1994) highlighted the incentive-
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eﬃcient properties of DEA that may be useful in the regulatory implication of the 
analysis. 
However, a well-known limitation of this methodology is its sensitivity to outlier. 
The following text provides an overview of the research that have analysed the 
eﬀect of ownership on WSS eﬃciency applying DEA. As regards to the puzzling 
eﬀect of the ownership on the WSS utilities eﬃciency, the ﬁrst paper to apply the 
concept of Farrell eﬃciency83 was Byrnes et al. (1986)in the USA context.  
The paper contributed to the literature in three diﬀerent ways: 1) measuring the 
eﬃciency directly in terms of the production relationship, instead of estimating a 
cost function ﬁrst; 2) using linear programming techniques, that have the 
advantage of not imposing any restrictions concerning the distribution of the 
data; 3) focusing on technical and scale eﬃciency on the basis of Farrell (1957). 
The theoretical perspective on which the paper was grounded provided 
arguments that private ﬁrms were more eﬃcient than publicly owned ﬁrms. 
However, the non parametric tests used revealed no evidence that the latter 
utilities were more wasteful or operated with more slack than privately owned 
utilities (Byrnes et al. 1986 p. 341). Following and adjusting Byrnes et al. (1986) 
method, several studies have applied Farrell eﬃciency and DEA (Charner et al. 
1978) to analyse the relationship between ownership and WSS utilities eﬃciency 
around the world.  
The following review provides an overview of the research on the eﬀect of 
ownership on WSS utilities eﬃciency classifying the studies in three groups with 
reference to their results: 1) studies that reported no inﬂuence of ownership on 
eﬃciency; 2) research that argue that public ownership improve the eﬃciency 
and ﬁnally 3) analysis claiming to ﬁnd better eﬃciency score for private owned 
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utilities. In the ﬁrst group of studies can be included Byrnes et al. (1986) beside 
other more recent research.  
Firstly, Garca-Snchez (2006) estimates the technical and the scale eﬃciency of 
the Spanish municipalities and distinguishes between those who externalized the 
WSS to private owned utilities and those who provide the service through public 
business corporations. The paper does not reject the null hypothesis of the non 
parametric Mann Whitneys test that the type of ownership discriminates 
eﬃciency level. Therefore, it claims that in the speciﬁc context analysed the 
creation of quasi-market does not seem to aﬀect eﬃciency. The author suggest 
that this result can be justiﬁed by the fact that the creation of public business 
corporations relieves the management of the business from the traditional public 
sector bureaucratic procedures. Secondly, in 2013 a study about Estonian WSS 
utilities did not reject the hypothesis of no diﬀerence in eﬃciency between water 
utilities with diﬀerent types of ownership grounded on transaction cost and 
industrial organization theory (Peda et al. 2013). Moreover, the research studies 
the inﬂuence of size on eﬃciency. In this case, the paper found a positive 
relationship between the size of the population served and the eﬃciency levels 
corroborating the assumption of scale economy gains. However, the study did not 
combine the inﬂuence of both size and ownership on eﬃciency score. Finally, in 
the same year another study focused on Spain rural area have been published 
(Gonzlez-Gmez et al. 2013). 
It found that both private owned utilities and public-private partnerships are 
signiﬁcant more eﬃcient than public owned. However the diﬀerences in the 
association between the type of ownership and external variables such as, 
economies of density, water source and seasonality of demand, are found not 
signiﬁcant. The authors argue that these result indicate that whether 
environmental factor are taken into account the diﬀerences in the eﬃciency 
scores disappears. Among others, in the second group of studies can be found a 
research published in 2011 about comparing the eﬃciency of 43 Italian water 
utilities in 2007 (Romano and Guerrini 2011). From the literature review 
conducted for the current paper, it seems that Romano and Guerrini (2011) is the 
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ﬁrst research about Italian water utilities applying DEA. The paper ﬁnds that 
publicly owned utilities obtain a higher eﬃciency score compared with mixed 
enterprises . The authors interpret these results suggesting that public owned 
utilities are better able to acquire and use their inputs. In the third group of 
studies the superiority of privately owned utilities is found. In Gonzlez-Gmez et 
al. 2013 is reported that this group is constituted by a smaller number of research 
compared with the other two groups. In particular, Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2009 
found that privately owned utilities have better eﬃciency score than publicly 
owned utilities. The authors claim that this result is due to eﬃciency in the 
employment of labour. Indeed, they argue that the inﬂuence of union trade makes 
adjustment to the number of employees diﬃcult. In conclusion, from the 
literature review emerges that puzzle arose in the 1980s is still unsolved, 
therefore more evidence are needed. Moreover, although some of the studies 
cited (Peda et al. 2013; Romano and Guerrini 2011) consider the eﬀect of size 
and geographical location, none of them have taken into account the possible 
moderator inﬂuence of these variables on the relationship between ownership and 
eﬃciency. Therefore, the current research contributes to literature investigating 
ﬁrstly the eﬀect of three variables separately and subsequently combining their 
eﬀect on eﬃciency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The application of model DEA 
 
The Sample 
 
The sample consisted of  fifteen companies operating in the distribution, 
sewerage and treatment of integrated Italian water service over the period 2014-
2015. Plus, the sample analyses nineteen Portuguese companies as far as year 
2014 is concerned.  
 
 
 
The companies we have taken into consideration, as far as our country is 
concerned, are divided into two regions: Tuscany on one side and Piedmont on 
the other side. For the Italy, we have chosen these two regions because they have, 
more or less, the same regional PIL, respectively 106.012 and 143.169 euros 
(data taken in 2012). We already know that after the application of the Galli Law 
for a better develop of the integrated water system (SII in Italian), our country 
has been divided into the so-called Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali (ATO); Tuscany 
has its own ATO, which has been called Autorità Idrica Toscana (AIT), but, 
inside of it, we cannot identify one big company carrying out the service; on the 
contrary, this is has been divided, in its turn, into various companies:  
 
16% 
18% 
32% 
34% 
Composing of sample 
Utility in Toscany, 7 
Utility in Piemont, 8 
Utilily in Lisbon, 14 
Utility in Porto, 15 
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 Publiacqua s.p.a. ;  
 
Since the 1st of January 2002 Publiacqua S.p.A. is the society which has been 
entrusted of the integrated water system service management of the Ambito 
Territoriale Ottimale nr. 3 Medio Valdarno, a territory that is a load-bearing axis 
of Tuscany, including 4 provinces: Florence, Prato, Pistoia and Arezzo. In the 46 
served town halls lives one-third of the regional population (about 1.277.000 
inhabitants) and there are located the main economic activities of Tuscany.  
Publiacqua is about the interception, the treatment, the channeling and the 
distribution of drinkable water. Our activity is about both aquifers and superficial 
waters. The company manages a complex and articulated installation system, 
starting from the big structures of the Tuscan county town (system of drinkability 
of Anconella and Mantignano). 
 In all the managed territory, besides of the distribution of drinkable water, the 
society carries out the collection of wastewater and their depuration, where the 
installation of San Colombiano (in Florence) is the point of excellence. The 
integrated management of the depurative system carried out by one subject only 
in a so vast territory is an essential prerequisite for its modernisation and 
efficiency, also with the aim to reduce the pollution level of the region’s fluvial 
waters. 
Publiacqua Spa’s mission is the one to guarantee quality and continuity of the 
service in the whole served territory at low cost, even in case of emergency or 
drought, and to assure the constant safeguard of water and environmental 
resources. All of this is possible thanks to one of the most advanced and modern 
productive and managerial system in Italy. 
 
In order to safeguard the environment and with the aim to reduce the greenhouse 
gases’ emission, the company is carrying out programs of electric consume 
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reduction and it realised, among other things, a hydroelectric installation for 
energy production with renewable fonts
84
. 
 
Figure 28: The data about Publiacqua S.p.a 
 
ELEMENTS NUMBER 
Municipalities served (n) 46 
Km of surface (km) 3380 
Population served (n) 1.304.000 
Km of water mains (Km) 7.152 
Km of sewerage netto (km) 3.837 
Purifiers (n) 128 
Water treatment plants (n) 106 
Laboratories for the control (n) 1 
analytical and chemical controls 
carried (n) 
300.000 
Employees (n) 598 
Revenue (mln) 218 mln of euro 
investments made (mln) 833 mln of euro 
Source: my elaboration 
 
 Acque Spa;  
 
Acque SpA was born from the unification of five public companies (Pisa’s Gea, 
Empoli’s Publiservizi, Pontedera’s Cerbaie, Pescia’s Coad and Capannori’s 
Aquapur). Starting from the 1st of January 2002, the Autorità dell’Ambito 
Territoriale Ottimale (ATO 2) entrusted the integrated water service management 
of Basso Valdarno: a territory among five provinces (Pisa, Lucca, Pistoia, 
Florence, Siena), distributed on 55 town halls where live more than 800k 
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inhabitants and that is extended from the heart of Tuscany until the Tyrrhenian 
coast. 
Coherent with the established duties expressed in the convention of the service 
entrustment, Acque SpA has carried out a public competition at European level 
for the selection of a private partner, which has ended, by the established time, 
with the awarding of 45% of the social capital to Abab SpA, a group including 
the company Acea SpA, Suez Italy SpA, Vianini Lavori SpA and CTC Società 
Cooperativa. 
Acque SpA is called to carry out a twenty-year plan of investments for 651 
million of euros, made to guarantee more and more high qualitative standards of 
water service and to extend in all the served area and efficient system of drainage 
and depuration, under the environmental protection and guarantying the health of 
citizens. 
Water is the most precious good for our lives. We often operate like it is an 
eternally available resource, but it is not. Survival, wealth and the socio-
economic development of the whole humanity depends on the capacity to assure 
the access to a safe, clean and sufficient fresh water font. 
In this perspective it is necessary to build a modern water industry serving 
citizens and economic activities, capable to realise a rational, efficient and 
occulated management of the water resource. This is exactly the mission of 
Acque SpA, which operates in a relevant portion of Tuscany, as the only 
manager of the integrated cycle of waters in Basso Valdarno. 
Acque S.p.A. operates in a public local services sector of high social value and 
great utility for collectivity. This is the reason why it aims to offer the best 
quality standards to its constumers, at low and competitive cost, respecting the 
duties established by the services paper, by the integrated water service 
regulations and by the entrustment convention. 
 
Acque SpA entrusts its management to criteria of transparency, efficiency and 
responsibility, and it aims to realise its enterprise objectives, respecting the social 
and environmental purposes defined with the local corporations of reference and 
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undertaking particularly to safeguard the surrounding environment and to 
contribute to the sustainable develop of territory
85
. 
Figure 31: The Data of Acque S.p.a.  
 
ELEMENTS NUMBER 
Municipalities served (n) 55 
Population served (n) 735.404 
Km of water mains (km) 5.898 
Km of sewerage netto (km) 3.081 
Purifiers (n) 128 
water service coverage (%) 95.32% 
Laboratories for the control (n) 1 
Revenue (mln) 153.419.309 
revenue water volume (m3) 43.947.332 
Source: my elaboration 
 
 
Source: Acque S.p.a. Official website 
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 Acquedotto del Fiora Spa;  
The Acquedotto del Fiora Spa is the so-called Gestore Unico del Servizio Idrico 
Integrato in the Conferenza Territoriale nr. 6 “Ombrone” of the Autorità Idrica 
Toscana. The company manages the whole of the interception, production and 
distribution water services for domestic usage, of the drainage and depuration of 
wastewater, besides of the installations for the tertiary treatment of water and its 
irrigation and industrial use. Acquedotto del Fiora SPA projects, implements and 
manages the installations of sea and salt water for drinkable use.  
 
The activities of the Servizio Idrico Integrato management are about networks 
(aqueducts and drainages) and installations (water purifiers, desalination plants, 
drainage raisings) of 56 county towns in the provinces of Grosseto and Siena, 
which constitute the Conferenza Territoriale nr. 6 Ombrone, the vastest of the 
Tuscan region, with an extension of beyond 7.600 km² and a resident population 
of about 407.000 unities (the most sparsely populated area in Italy, about 54 
inhabitants/km²) that, during summer, reaches superior peaks (800.000 unities). 
The structure managed by Acquedotto is constituted by 9.079 km of aqueduct 
networks and by 3.211 km of drainage ones, plus more than 2.694 installations 
managed. The service of drainage and depuration is supplied to 84% of users, 
percentage which notably increases if we consider that 13% of resident 
population has independent drainage and depuration. 
The total number of users are about 234.122 and it has been estimated that they 
will consume about 29,3 millions of cubic meters of water by the end of 2014. It 
is a territory where Acquedotto del Fiora is conducting an important program of 
investments (Piano d’Ambito); by the end of the Convenzione about 500 millions 
of euros are expected. 
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For 2015 the production value is about 103.15 millions/€ while the realised net 
investments are about 38,5 millions/€. 
The average 2015 organic is constituted by 409 unities. 
 
The supplied water is collected by 50% from the Fiora sources present in the 
Amiata mountain, while in the Sienese area the most relevant installation is the 
aqueduct del Vivo which collects water from the three sources of Amiata 
Ermicciolo, Ente and Burlana, located in the area of Vivo d’Orcia.86 
Figure 30: The data of Acquedotto del Fiora S.p.a  
ELEMENTS NUMBER 
Municipalities served (n) 60 
Km of surface (km) 7600 
Population served (n) 405.065 
Km of water mains (km) 9.079 
Km of sewerage netto (km) 3.211 
Purifiers (n) 128 
Water treatment plants (n) 106 
Laboratories for the control (n) 2 
Employees (n) 409 
Revenue(mln) 103.15 mln of Euro 
Investments pro-capit made (mln) 102 euro 
                     Source: my elaboration 
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 Asa Spa;  
 
ASA Spa operates in the integrated water system (aqueduct, drainage, 
depuration) and in the gas distribution. Since 2002 it is the only manager of the 
water system in the ATO 5 Toscana Costa, whose costumers basis is 360.900 
inhabitants, divided into 33 town halls belonging to 3 provinces (Leghorn, Pisa 
and Siena). As far as gas distribution is concerned, ASA is present in 5 town 
halls of the province of Leghorn with 226.659 served inhabitants. Finally, ASA is 
concentrated on strategic lines in the field of traditional energetic production 
(natural liquid gas) and alternative one (wind-energetic and photovoltaic); 
ASA SpA, as the Gestore Unico del Servizio Idrico Integrato for the Autorità 
Idrica Toscana (Conferenza Territoriale nr. 5 “Toscana Costa”, ex AATO 5) and 
distributor of methane gas in many town halls of the province of Leghorn, wants 
to promote a cultural change in the territorial area in which it operates, aimed to 
spread and develop the “Etica e la Responsabilità Sociale”, in their widest 
meaning, as a strategic instrument of develop and achievement  of the “Missione 
Aziendale”. 
 
With “Missione Aziendale” we mean the carrying out of the company that 
operates on the territory to supply public services of primary relevance, 
guarantying the access to a public and universal service respecting the quality 
standards agreed with the regulation organs, and in order to promote sustainable 
develop through transparent procedures and adequate mechanisms of financing 
and balance for the  company.  
As first concrete deed, ASA SpA adopts a “politica dei valori” that can be 
applied both to the Capogruppo’s decisional processes and to the controlled 
companies. The companies that participate are also invited to uniform their own 
“modus operandi”, if applicable, to the principles expressed in the policy through 
formal adhesion, showed by the respective administration and/or control organs. 
In order to spread and affirm these managerial principles in the territorial area of 
reference, ASA S.p.A. reserves the right to favour, respecting the European and 
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national norms, in the processes of selection for supplies and contracts, the 
companies which are certified or certifying UNI EN ISO 14001:2004, registered 
EMAS (Sistemi di gestione ambientale) or SA8000:2001 (Sistema di gestione 
Etica e di Responsabilità). 
 
 
 Gaia Spa; 
 
GAIA S.p.A. is a public capital company that, since the 1st of January 2005, 
manages the integrated water system, agreeing with what the Convenzione, along 
with AIT (Autorità Idrica Toscana), established during the territorial conference 
nr. 1 “Toscana-Nord”. 
This integrated water system is constituted by all the public services of 
interception, installation and distribution of water and drainage and depuration of 
the wastewater, plus the waste disposal, as provided by the norm in force.  
GAIA manages the water services in a territory that includes a big part of the 
town counties of the province of Lucca (Garfagnana, Media Valle del Serchio, 
Versilia), three town counties of Val di Lima in province of Pistoia and the town 
counties of the province of Massa (except Zeri). 
The area expands on 48 town counties, 2.586 Km
2 
in total, where there are 
445.515 inhabitants (istat data of 2013) and about 2600 users.  
The aqueduct network is about 5.200 km long and the drainage one is beyond 
1.900 km, while the active depuration installations are 490. 
GAIA manages the entrusted service, the infrastructures and the users, with about 
474 employees  (data of the 31st of October 2013), including the operative and 
white-collar personal of technique, administrative and commercial sectors
87
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 Nuove Acque Spa; 
 
Nuove Acque S.p.A. has been constituted in 1999 for the integrated water service 
management in the A.T.O. (Ambito Territoriale Ottimale) nr. 4 Alto Valdarno, 
which includes 31 town counties of the province of Arezzo and 5 of the province 
of Siena. The company Nuove Acque Spa will last until the 31st of December 
2050. 
 
The first Italian experience of application of Galli Law about water cycle’s 
integrated management (L. 36/1994) was in Arezzo, with the overcoming of the 
managements directed by the single town counties. The A.A.T.O. nr. 4 – today 
called AIT Conferenza Territoriale ATO 4 Alto Valdarno – has been, so, the first 
Autorità di Ambito to be constituted in application of the new norm, and Nuove 
Acque S.p.A. the first manager. The company Nuove Acque SpA set its mission 
as the one to erogate the integrated water service on the ATO 4 Alto Valdarno, 
respecting the piano d’ambito, the economic financial plan and the users 
regulations, turning out to be a point of reference for service, territory’s 
innovation and employees’ number growth. 
To reach these results, Nuove Acque chose a specific company policy for the 
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service quality, for the environmental protection, for the health and safety on the 
workplace and about a social and ethic policy
88
.  
 
Figure 33: The data of Nuove Acque S.p.a.  
ELEMENTS NUMBER 
Municipalities served (n) 36 
Km of surface (km) 3.272 
Population served (n) 300.000 
Km of water mains (km) 3.444 
Km of sewerage netto (km) 1.727 
Purifiers (n) 75 
Water treatment plants (n) 50 
Laboratories for the control 
(n) 
1 
Employees (n) 203 
Revenue(mln) 47.5 mln of Euro 
Investments From 1999 to 
2015 (mln) 
176.5  
                   Source: my elaboration 
 
 Geal Spa;  
 
GEAL S.p.A. (Gestione Esercizio Acquedotti Lucchesi) is a joint-stock company 
operating in the sector of water cycle from the 6th of November 1995. 
It concerns management, maintenance and planning of the networks and 
aqueduct, drainage and depuration installations. At present, this activity is carried 
out thanks to the town county of Lucca and it can satisfy 14 town counties. 
GEAL S.p.A. has got a wholesale drinkable water supply contract with Pisa’s 
and Leghorn’s ACQUE S.p.A.89  
                                      
88
 Nuove acque s.p.a. official website 
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Figure 34: The data of Geal S.p.a.  
 
ELEMENTS NUMBER 
Users connected to the water 
network 
39.041 
Km of water mains (km) 587 
Purifiers (n) 47 
Water treatment plants (n) 46 
Laboratories for the control (n) 1 
Water Facturated (m3) 13.555.000 
Km of surface (km) 600 
       Source: my elaboration 
 
The sample used for our analysis turns out to be composed by the Piedmontese 
region, where the regulator’s choice about the division in ATO has been 
different, though. Piedmont has been divided into even 6 ATO, that are the 
following:   
 
a. ATO nr. 1: Verbano Cusio Ossola, Pianura, Novara; 
 
It covers the territory of the provinces of Novara and Verbano Cusio Ossola, the 
first one not completely. The A.T.O. nr. 1 “Verbano Cusio Ossola e Pianura 
Novarese” has got beyond 3.600 sqm², a level of 14% of the regional territory. 
The prevalent percentage belongs to the province of Verbania with 63%, the 
resting 37% to the province of Novara. The average demographic denseness of 
A.T.O. nr. 1 is about 140 inhabitants/km², with a total population of 502.609 
inhabitants, so divided: 68% belonging to the province of Novara, 32% to the one 
of VCO. The interested town counties are 164. The gestore unico is Acqua 
Novara VCO SpA. 
                                                                                                     
89
 Geal s.p.a. official website 
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b. ATO nr. 2: Biellese – Vercellese – Casalese 
 
The authority is constituted by the Amministrazioni Provinciali of Biella, 
Vercelli, Alessandria, Turin and Novara, by the four Comunità Montane 
belonging to the provinces of Vercelli and Biella, and by the 184 town counties 
which are included in the territorial perimeter of the Autorità d’Ambito nr. 2, as 
provided by law 13/97 and belonging to the provinces of Vercelli, Biella, 
Alessandria and Turin. The managers are different: Azienda Multiservizi 
Casalese S.p.A., Azienda Multiservizi Valenzana S.p.A., Atena S.p.A., Cordar 
S.p.A., Biella servizi, Cordar Valsesia S.p.A., S.I.I. S.p.A., Comuni riuniti S.r.l. 
 
c. ATO nr. 3: Torinese 
 
The ATO 3 includes a wide territory, entirely located in the province of Turin 
and it is constituted by 306 town counties grouped into 6 Comunità Montane and 
13 Aree Territoriali Omogenee, following the reorganisation of the Comunità 
Montane. The managers are two: Smat Turin that covers 212 town counties and 
Acea Pinerolese that covers 54. 
 
d. ATO nr. 4: Cuneese 
 
The Autorità d’Ambito del Cuneese is operative since the 11th of September 
2002, the territory served is composed by 250 town counties of the ATO 4, 
where lives a population of almost 560.000 inhabitants, with almost 10.000 km 
of aqueduct network, supplied by beyond 1.000 interceptions works, almost 
150.000 mc of balance tanks, beyond 3.000 km of drainage networks and almost 
800 depuration installations. 
 
e. ATO nr. 5: Astigiano, Monferrato 
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The Autorità d’Ambito nr. 5 Astigliano Monferrato has been constituted on the 
5th of February 1999 in the province of Asti. The Ambito territory includes 154 
town counties belonging to three different provinces: 104 to the province of Asti, 
43 to the province of Alessandria and 7 to the province of Turin. The town 
counties are grouped in four different Aree Territoriali Omogenee, whose 
representatives, along with the ones of the provinces, constitute the Conferenza 
dell’Autorità d’Ambito nr. 5. The managers are many in this case, too: 
Acquedotto Valtiglione, Acquedotto della Piana, Asti Servizi Pubblici, Consorzio 
Monferrato. 
 
f. ATO nr. 6: Alessandrino 
 
In the ATO 6 are included 148 town counties belonging to the province of 
Alessandria (134) and to the province of Asti (14), divided, as far as 
representativeness is concerned, into 5 Aree Territoriali Omogenee and 3 
Comunità Montane. The managers are two: Amag and Gestione Acqua. 
 
Figure 35: The ATO in Piedmont 
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In the case of Piedmont, though, there are some companies that, along with the 
water service, carry out other activities, for example, the ones related to the 
creation and distribution of electric energy and gas. We are talking about 
multiutility companies, then. This is the reason why they have not been object of 
our analysis, since it was not the aim of the work and we were not able to 
identify with certainty the single data related to the water activity for the 
construction of our  database.  
 
On the other hand, our sample was based also on Portugal, where, differently 
from our country, there is not a division into ATO, but, however, the analysis has 
been focused always on two different regions: the district of Lisbon and the one 
of Porto. In each “province” of Portugal there is a correspondent company that 
carries out water service and, in some cases, other services, too. 
 
After having identified, both in Italy and Portugal, the companies that carry out 
water service, the next step has been the creation of a database to collect the most 
significant data for our analysis. The creation of the database taking into 
consideration the years 2014-2015 has been carried out in an unusual way: the 
database about Italy has been drafted taking the useful data from the balances of 
the single companies as far as water was concerned (www.acqua.gov.it); while, 
about Portugal, the data are exclusively taken from the year 2014 and have been 
inserted in the database after having taken them from the official site of ERSAR. 
 
The data collected for each operator of the sample were essentially of two types: 
Economic Data and Technical management data.  
 
 Economic data (costs, revenues but not only this). 
Total revenues for the sample examined (34 firms) include total revenue from 
water service: it is especially composed of revenues from water distribution, 
sewage and treatment;  
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• Operating revenues 
• Other revenues.  
 Total revenues of water distribution represent the highest percentage of 
revenues. 
 
The main cost voices are:  
• Cost of raw materials;  
• Cost of labour  
• Cost of services; 
• Depreciation of material and not material goods  
• Other management costs.  
 An another data that I had found is the price of labour is obtained as the 
ratio between the cost of staff and the number of employees in the service 
water system. The average cost per employee gives an indication on the 
economy of management. In fact, it allows to assess whether personnel 
costs are higher compared to those of other operators. On the sample 
under investigation it can be said that the size does not affect the cost of 
labour, while there is a difference depending on the region (Northern, 
Central and Southern Italy) in which the firm operates.  However, the 
mean cost per employee by region is not so much away from each other 
and therefore should not be subject to high attention, in contrast to the 
high levels of disparities between companies operating in developed 
countries and those operating in not developed countries. The 
interregional difference in the price of labour is not relevant. It is also 
important noting that the average cost per employee calculated on this 
way does not take into account the number of managers, employees, 
workers and therefore represents a general average both for small than for 
large firms. This is because the available data in many cases don’t 
distinguish the type of employee. 
 
 Technical management data .  
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The technical data provide the size of the service managed. They concern 
the number of users, the Km of water delivered and sewerage, the Mc of 
water fed into the grid, the Mc of water supplied, the Mc of water treated, 
the network losses. 
 
Users are people who get water for:  
• civil home use; 
• not home civil use, defined as consumption (schools, public buildings, 
railway stations, etc.). 
• other uses relating to the business and commercial areas and general office 
buildings. 
 
For the Km of network considering that the pipes distributing water to users are a 
crucial element to take into account whenever we discuss on the problems of 
inefficiency characterizing the water distribution system. In Italy, a large amount 
of water is lost on a journey along the pipeline. The water service sector shows 
serious deficiencies; these ones are particularly serious in some areas of the 
country: the South and the two main Islands suffer from severe infrastructure 
deficits. 
For the water injected into the network, the network losses and Mc treated  we 
must assert that the integrated water cycle consists of three basic steps: collection 
of water, grid for distribution to users, purification of wastewater collected from 
the sewer system. 
The users receive only a part of the water fed into the grid, because there are 
usually infrastructure network losses. The treated water coming in a year to users 
takes the name of water delivered.  The growing attention towards a sustainable 
water is of primary importance in order to achieve a more efficient management 
of water systems. However a distribution network, without loss, is a goal both 
technically and economically unfeasible. The manager should know the level of 
losses being economically acceptable implementing a network management 
allowing water to reach optimum levels of efficiency for its water system. The 
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sewerage service, the last step of the water cycle, consists of the collection 
(catchment) of wastewater from private homes, industrial sites, urban areas, 
roads and public areas. 
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Methods of Analysis 
 
Literature reports two main approaches to get quantitative measures of 
efficiency,  the parametric approach that uses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
by implementing  an econometric estimation of a model specified in advance, 
and the non-parametric approach that uses DEA. Both methods present 
advantages and drawbacks. However, differently from SFA, the non-parametric 
DEA approach does not require either the specification of a functional form, or 
any assumption related to variable distribution. Further, DEA can identify the 
sources and the level of inefficiency for each decision taking unit under 
examination. The adoption of DEA has been widely used in literature to 
purposely measure efficiency in the water management sector and several models 
including different sets of inputs and outputs have been proposed by estimating 
an empirical production function frontier from a set of input and output data 
relative to a sample of homogeneous units.  
The production frontier is generated solving a sequence of linear programming 
(LP) problems, one for each utility included in the sample, while the relative 
efficiency measure of an utility, in our case, is evaluated by the distance between 
the actual observation and the frontier obtained from all the Decion Maker Units 
(DMU) under examination, adopting the Farrell measure of technical efficiency 
(TE) as a measure for the utility efficiency score. Given the set of utilities, the 
model determines for each one the optimal set of input weights and output 
weights that maximise its efficiency score.  
An water utility is efficient, if TE = 1 or TE > 1, but if TE <1 an ATO is 
considered technically not efficient. So the DMU is to be considered relatively 
inefficient, if it is possible to expand any of its outputs without reducing any of 
its inputs and any other output (output orientation), or if it is possible to reduce 
any of its inputs without reducing any output and without expanding some other 
inputs (input orientation).  
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For our analysis the analysis method chosen is the output orientation and in the 
same time also the input orientation. The output orientation meaning that we tend 
to identify the extra output quantity that each inefficient unity may produce using 
the same  inputs (DEA with output orientation); to better understand the output 
orientation we can quote an example, reminding that the analysis’ result is a 
ranking of all the productive unities, to which a score from 0 to 1 or higher than 
1, is assigned, according to the theory of Farrell. 
While, the input orientation is defined as the amount of input that each inefficient 
unit can save by producing the same amount of output .    
Score 1 indicates the maximum efficiency. The gap between one (maximum 
efficiency) and the defined score expresses, on the contrary, the percentage of 
input which is potentially savable (input orientation) or the entity of extra output 
that we can obtain (output orientation) from the examined unity. With the output 
orientation the objective is to calculate if the factory under evaluation can 
increase its outputs while keeping the inputs at their current levels. In the 
opposite an input orientation is privileged and the production function is 
constructed by searching for the maximum possible proportional reduction in 
input usage, while output levels are held fixed. This choice was largely justified 
as infrastructure investments in the water service industry need continuous 
maintenance to keep service quality at given standards  and demand remains 
almost steady, while a major objective of management and administrators is to 
reduce costs. 
 Adopting an output orientation, a 0,80 score means that the unity may produce, 
with the same mix of resources, an extra 20% of output. Rather, for the input 
orientation, a score equal to  80% means that the DMU may decrease by 20% the 
class of input to obtain an equal output level. 
So, all that we have described shows that in the output oriented the scores have a 
different logic compared to input oriented. In fact, a score between 0 and 1 
indicates an efficient DMU, but in the moment in which the score is higher than 
1, this means that the utility is inefficient. For the input orientation we analyze 
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the data between 0 and 1, if the efficiency score is close to 1 it means that it is 
efficient. 
 
Out analysis has as object different developments of the DEA model, the first 
case was “wider”, the second one “smaller”. This division was due to the fact 
that we considered a different number of input and output. First, three inputs and 
two outputs have been identified, eventually two inputs and one output, with the 
both model (the first with output orientation and after with input orientation). In 
fact, one of the most important challenges in the application of DEA is the 
selection of the input-output variables.  
Furthermore, all can be divided into two different works; we confronted two 
countries, Italy and Portugal, on the whole, while on the other hand we 
confronted the single regions, Tuscany-Piedmont and  Lisbon-Porto. 
 
So, model includes three inputs and two outputs for model 1 and two inputs and 
one output for model 2. These are based on physical (i.e., network length, water 
amount), economical (i.e., operational costs), and management data (i.e., number 
of employees). Variables with various units have been included in the efficiency 
model as in DEA implementation input and output variables do not need to be 
commensurate with each other. 
 
1 Inputs  
• input 1: number of employees working in the DMU (no. of people)  
• input 2: loss of water (difference between the amount of water 
introduced in the network and the amount of water effectively distributed 
to consumer premises) (cubic m)  
• input 3: operative costs (€), without staff cost but with the calculation of 
inflation 
 
2 Outputs 
• output 1: invoiced amount of water (cubic m)  
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• output 2: water made drinkable by utility (metric cubic).  
• output 3: population of municipalities served (no. of people). 
The difference between the two model is the choose of the input and output for 
each one:  
 
Figure 34: The two models 
Variables Model  1 Model 2 
Operative Costs 
(€) 
 
X 
 
 
X 
number of employees 
working in the DMu 
(no. of people) 
 
X 
 
loss of water 
(metric cubic) 
 
X 
 
X 
population  served or 
total customers 
(no. of people) 
 
X 
 
Water made drinkable 
by utility 
(metric cubic) 
 
X 
 
invoiced amount of 
water (cubic m) 
  
X 
 
 
As far as the water made drinkable by the factory is concerned, we need to point 
out this, since it turns out to be a datum that we calculated independently; 
regarding Italy, on the site of “water portal” we noticed the cubic meters made 
drinkable per region (267129000 Tuscany and 248254000 Piedmont), so the next 
step was to compare the values with the kilometers of distribution pipes of every 
single company taken into consideration. Regarding Portugal instead, having 
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different data at disposal, the calculation has been carried out in a different way. 
In the portal of ERSAR, for every single company, is gathered the percentage of 
water made drinkable by the factory, plus, having the data of the invoiced water, 
we have been able to obtain the cubic meters of water made drikable, multiplying 
the values just sta 
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Results 
 
This section reports and analyses the eﬃciency score of the Italian water utilities 
and provides the result for all the three tests.  
First, however, to observe and comment on the results it should be remembered 
that we carried out our analysis with the output, where a score between 0 and 1 
indicates DMU efficient while a score > 1 means utility inefficient.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics of input and output variables of the DEA 
model.  Both standard deviation and maximum-minimum range values clearly 
show that the DMUs greatly differs as to inputs and outputs. In some cases the 
standard deviation value is rather larger than meaner and, when lower than 
meaner, it is very close to its value. In particular, the utilities differ as to their 
size and the size of their operations (i.e., the amount of water delivered to 
consumers, the size of population served, the overall length of water and 
sewerage network, etc.). Indeed, sample includes both factories that deliver 
integrated water services to small municipalities only and utilities that provide 
services to more than 300 municipalities. This huge variance in the sample 
justifies the choice to implement a VRS DEA model to benchmark DMUs and 
investigates their efficiency rate. 
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Source: My own elaboration 
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The following table shows the outcome of the DEA analysis implementation with 
the output orientation. The tables show the global efficiency estimates for Italian  
water utilities, for both models and using VRS approaches, so using a BCC 
model. If the VRS efficiency estimates of a given DMU are not equal, it means 
that DMU is not operating at an optimal scale. Moreover, using an output 
orientation, the difference between an efficiency score and the unity  represents 
the percentage to increase the mix of output would possible using the same 
quantity of input. This increase could be achieved with the improvement of both 
scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency. As it can easily be seen, 
Portuguese utilities appear to be slightly more efficient than the Italian factory. In 
fact, taking into account those specific inputs and outputs, Portuguese utilities 
seem to be the most efficient ones while Italian companies hit the worst 
efficiency scores.  
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                                Source: my own elaboration 
 
 
                                    Source: my own elaboration 
 
 
                            Source: my own elaboration 
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As we can see from the tables, we have carried out two types of different 
confrontations.  
The first analysis calculated the efficiency of Italian companies inside the two 
regions taken into consideration, along with the border of Italian efficiency, and 
using both models.  
From the analysis it is possible to understand that our companies are efficient 
and, in many cases, may occur DMU inefficient. 
The company which turns out to be the worse on the Italian territory is Acque 
Novara VCO S.p.A. in Piedmont, ATO nr. 1. Plus, this is verified in both the 
year taken into consideration, in fact the Efficiency Score has been about 
269.43% (2015) and 289.47% (2014).  
On the other hand, it is interesting to consider how companies which present the 
best value are perfectly efficient, since their score is about 100%. Among these: 
Publiacqua S.p.A., Gaia S.p.A., Cordar Valsesia S.p.A., SMAT Torino, ATO 
nr.4, Acquedotto Valtiglione, Consorzio Monferrato. 
We can notice that many companies presenting a score about 100% are, almost 
exclusively, Piedmontese companies taken into consideration by our analysis, 
except Publiacqua S.p.a and Gaia s.p.a which operates in the Florentine territory 
and for Gaia, which is located in the north- west of Tuscany. From this we can 
certainly affirm that Piedmont companies are more efficient than the Tuscan 
ones. 
Considering then that the totality of the utilities and the oriented output concept, 
this means that DMUs can produce adjunctive quantities of outputs with the 
available inputs. But in our case this is impossibile; This is easily understandable 
also from the average value of the calculated efficiency scores: 153.86% in 2015 
and 156.97% in 2014, data that are found out with the first model, object of 
examination. So, we can affirm that both Tuscan and Piedmontese companies are 
able to produce even 50% more of outputs than what they are requested to. 
It is interesting to notice though, that between the two years there has been a 
decrease of the average value, maybe this is due to favoorable periods at a 
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company level (costs increase, personal in decrease, losses) or regarding external 
factors, which are not indeed controllable by the company. 
This seems to be reversed if we note the second model, two inputs and one 
output. 
The average in the efficiency scores is indeed 160.48% in 2015 and 156.50% in 
2014. Different from model 1, we obtain an increase of the score. All of this 
should not surprise because it is completely logical to have a reversed situation, 
since the objects of the analysis are different and, consequently, even the 
efficient borders are going to be. 
Thanks to the model object of analysis, we can see that the best enterprise are a 
lot, like Publiacqua s.p.a and Cordar Valsesia S.p.a. which operates in the Tuscan 
territory and Piemonts region. So, probably, this enterprise will be the one used 
as a reference point in the analysis of benchmarking.  
On the other side, even in this case, the DMUs presenting the maximum value 
correspond to the ones having an inefficiency score, Acquedotto del Fiora S.p.a 
for 2015 and Asa S.p.a for 2014 .  
In conclusion, from what we stated, it is possible to understand that the 
companies carrying out the integrated water service in the Italian mainland are 
some efficient but there is a very high number of DMU inefficient, demonstrating 
that this sector is constantly changing and that needs continuous monitoring and 
interventions by the authorities both at the regional and State.  
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The following table shows the outcome of the DEA analysis implementation 
with the output orientation. The tables show the global efficiency estimates for 
the Portuguese water utilities, for both models and using VRS approaches, so 
using a BCC model. 
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                             Source: My own elaboration 
 
 
                              Source: My own elaboration 
 
                       
                             Source: My own elaboration 
 
The second analysis carried out allows to calculate the DMU efficiency of 
Portugal compared to its efficiency border. 
According to model nr. 1, even in this case the totality of the companies turn out 
to be efficient and inefficient. 
In fact, the maximum score turns out to be 282.64%, obtained calculating the 
data of CM de Póvoa de Varzim company, in the region of Porto. This company 
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turns out to be inefficient. It is the worse company in Portugal. So in this 
situation, perhaps, the best choice is to combine a strategic plan a benchmarking 
strategy to achieve as soon as possible the efficiency or at least a less critical than 
at present. 
The same matter can be repeated even when we observe model two, where, even 
in this case, we can find many companies which turn out to be inefficient and so, 
are able to obtain a low number of outputs with a given level of inputs.  
All the other companies turn out to be inefficient, except Santo Tirso and Trofa, 
CM de Paredes de Coura, Smas de Sintra, Aguas De Cascais, CM de Moita, Cm 
de Seixal which present a score about 99,99%, but they have the full right to be 
considered inside the category of the Portuguese efficient DMUs. 
 
The next step has been the one to confront the two Portuguese regions, Lisbon 
and Porto, always with the help of the two models, object of the exam. 
To make all of this, we have created two tables again, to help understanding. 
 
As far as model 1 is concerned, we can notice that DMUs presenting a higher 
score are in the region of Porto (CM de Póvoa de Varzim) and so, probably, this 
is gonna be the company that all the others will use as best practice for their 
analysis of benchmarking. 
On the other hand though, the highest average is in the region of Lisbon, so 
maybe, with this datum we can demonstrate that the companies in the territory of 
Porto are more efficient that the other ones located in the region of Lisbon. 
 
 
 
If we observe the data with reference to the second model instead, changing 
inputs, outputs and consequently the efficiency borders too, we can see that the 
most inefficient, enterprise is located in the region of Porto; and also that the 
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average value is superior compared to the other region taken into consideration. 
Then, in this case, the enterprises in the district of Lisbon turn out to be more 
efficient than the other ones taken into analysis. 
 
 
 
As we previously affirmed, the aim of our analysis is to analyse the efficiency of 
DMUs taken into consideration carrying out the DEA model with both output 
and input orientation. Now, I will explain the input orientation.  
 
Also, as far as the second analysis is concerned, the same inputs and outputs have 
been taken into consideration and the two used models have been carried out in 
this case, too. First, the model with three inputs and two outputs and 
subsequently two outputs and one output.   
Before describing our results though, it is useful to remind that in the input 
orientation the scores involved, Efficiency Score (ES), should be read in a 
different way: 
 0 < ES < 1 
 The more the score is close to 1, the more it will result efficient.  
 ES cannot ever be > 1 
 
So, with the help of the table and from what we have said before, we are able to 
affirm that as far as the first model is concerned (3 inputs and 2 outputs) we are 
talking about seven Italian companies resulting to be efficient, since they present 
a score about 1 or 100%. They are Publiacqua S.p.a.; Geal S.p.a; Cordar Valsesia 
S.p.a; SMAT torinese S.p.a; Ato n/4; Acquedotto Valtiglione S.p.a. and 
Consorzio Monferrato S.p.a. 
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                                       Source: my own elaboration 
 
155 
 
 
Among the efficient companies involved, maybe it deserves a little praise SMAT 
Torinese, since, as we can see from the table, has been able to mend the margin, 
even if little, in order to be efficient. This, maybe, is due both to company factors 
like major investments, increases of managerial capabilities, increases in the 
staff, ability to solve problems in short times, and maybe to environmental 
factors like, for example, major  precipitations.  
On the other hand, unfortunately, some cases of inefficient companies have been 
verified, 60% of Italian sample, this is demonstrated also by the calculation of the 
average standard. In this list, maybe the most problematic case is represented by 
Acquedotto del Fiora S.p.A., located in Tuscany with a score of 14, 93%, 
extremely low score, which shows a very complicated situation. For this, a 
possible solution could be to develop benchmarking in the company context and 
to observe all as a possible outburst for the future. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to explain the causes of this inefficiencies, since it 
is a limit of the DEA itself, but we can just make some simple suppositions. In 
fact, since it is the DEA to base itself on certain inputs and outputs, one of the 
reasons of these scores, it is the inappropriate use of these elements, which does  
not allow to reach satisfactory levels.  
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
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But which region turns out to be the most efficient between the two objects of 
analysis? To answer this question, it is necessary to make reference, one more 
time, to the table and the scores that we calculated. The highest number of 
efficient companies is located in Piedmont, in fact we have calculated 5 utilities 
presenting a score of 1 or 100%, versus the two Tuscan ones. 
All of this proves that Piedmont is more efficient than Tuscany. In this case it is 
hard as well, if not impossible, to give an explanation to this affirmation, but 
maybe it all can be explained at a regulation level, since some time ago, it had 
been decided to divide Tuscany in an only ATO, where only seven companies 
should operate, and subsequently a major territory, a major population, major 
users to satisfy confronted with Piedmont where we are talking about of six 
different ATOs and where we have a much higher number of companies. 
 
In conclusion, it is interesting to report that the efficient DMUs, which we 
obtainted from the calculation as far as both input and output orientation are 
concerned, are equal, exception made for one case only. 
In the oriented input Geal S.p.A. turns out to be efficient, while as far as output is 
concered, Gaia S.p.A.   
All of this absolutely should not surprise, since for each model two completely 
distinct starting bases are used.  
 
Also as far as the input oriented conception is concerned, we have developed the 
second model, 2 inputs, Operative Cost without the staff costs and the cubic 
meters of water lost in the distribution and 1 output, which is obtained from the 
cubic meters invoiced in the year. 
In this case, the number of efficient units lowers, in fact we have only five 
utilities having a score about 1: Publiacqua S.p.a., Cordar Valsesia, SMAT 
torinese S.p.a, ATO n/4 and Acquedotto Valtiglione.  
Also in this case, the number of the Piedmont companies is in relevant majority, 
strengthening even more our previous affirmation: the Piedmont DMUs are 
better than the Tuscan ones.   
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Plus, it is interesting to observe that companies which in the first model were 
efficient continue to be it in this case, too; although the number turns out to be 
inferior. Five with the second model versus the seven of the first one.  
All of this also leads to an average score which is inferior confronted with the 
one calculated with the first model.   
At the same time, this value shows a not so much rosy situation for the sector in 
examination; sector which, as affirmed, will have a long path to take to reach a 
satisfactory level. Practically, it should increase almost 50% of the input level to 
reach the same level of output. 
As previously, also as far as the second model is concerned, the DMUs resulting 
efficient turn out to be more or less equal, using both the input and output 
orientation.  
We have an exception anyway. In the first interpretation, the company called 
ATO n/4 is efficient, but not as far as the output orientation is concerned, on the 
contrary for Acquedotto della Piana S.p.A. the situation is totally opposite. 
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                          Source: my own elaboration 
 
After having analysed the output orientation case, we pass to describe the input 
orientation, with the clear acknowledgement that there is a difference in the 
conception, as far as the interpretation of scores is concerned . 
The first step is to describe the Portuguese DMUs located in two regions, Lisbon 
and Porto, using the DEA BCC model, that is VRS with 3 inputs and 2 outputs. 
The table reports the scores we have calculated with the model involved. 
We can see that, in the first model, twelve Portuguese DMUs turn out to be 
efficient. 
Among these, 6 are located in the region of Lisbon, while the other 6 in the 
region of Porto. So each region has got 50% of efficient companies. 
At the same time though, we can observe how the average, as far as the region of 
Lisbon (0,71) is concerned, turns out to be slightly inferior confronted to the one 
of Porto (0,74), and so, through this, we can demonstrate how the second region 
mentioned turns out to be only a little bit more efficient than the one in Lisbon. 
159 
 
On the other hand, the DMU presenting the lowest score is the SMAS de Vila 
Franca de Xira company with a score of 0.222, which operates in the province of 
the region of Lisbon. 
In the whole though, 41,37% of the Portuguese companies turns out to be 
efficient.  
All of this can be somehow supported by the average value calculated on the 
scores of efficiency, 0.72 or 72%, This value turns out to be inefficient, as we 
already know, but it can be read in a positive way anyway, since in this sector, 
which is under continuous risks, is a very high  score.  
At the same time, this value is undoubtedly useful to carry out a confrontation 
between the two countries objects of analysis, Italy and Portugal. 
As far as Italy is concerned, using the input conception and the first model, the 
average value is 0,61 or 61%, while as far as Portugal is concerned, is 72%. 
Being the Portuguese value the major, the Portuguese companies turn out to be, 
in this case, more efficient confronted to the ones in our country, for reasons 
varying from regulation to climate, to investments. In any case, to answer with 
confidence to which causes are, it is necessary a deeper analysis, which has not  
been object of our work, though. 
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
 
 
 
 Source: my own elaboration 
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After having said this, if we confront the two conceptions involved, we can 
observe that, as far as second model is concerned, in the output oriented it has 
been noticed a major number of efficient companies: fourteen compared to 
twelve. In this case, not Simar de Odivelas e Oiera, not Aguad de Gondomar 
have been considered efficient. 
 
As we previously did for the output orientation, in this case it is also useful to 
develop the next model, which includes 2 inputs and 1 outputs, always for the 
two regions of Portugal. 
With the constant help of the table, we can see that the number of the DMUs has 
increased confronted to the first model, in fact the efficient utilities turn out to be 
nine: CM de Alcochete, SMAS de Almada, Aguas de Cascais, CM de Mota, CM 
de Seixal, SMAS de Sintra, CM de Paredes de Coura, Aguas de Porto, SMAS 
Tirso and Trofa. All of this, confronted to the model 1, leads the average of 
DMUs to have a decrease; from the previous 41,27% we now have 31,03%. 
From all of this we understand how the number of the efficient companies is 
completely different from the previous case, also as far as the division of the 
latter ones in the Portuguese territory is concerned: six of them are located in the 
region of Lisbon, while only three in the region of Porto. Making an hypothetic 
confrontation between the two regions, then, the first would be seen as more 
efficient compared to the second. 
In any case, taking into consideration model 2, we have seen a minor number of 
efficient companies, but we can observe how there is an increase in the value of 
the average, in fact from a value of 72% they moved to 78%. As previously done, 
we can use such value to affirm that the companies in the water sector are better 
than the ours; the latter ones are able to increase, then, the number of inputs to 
reach the same level of outputs in a more appropriate, adequate and so more 
efficient way, compared to the companies of our territory.   
The last step that we have faced is the one to verify if companies who resulted to 
be efficient for the output oriented conception are still efficient as far as the input 
oriented one is concerned. 
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All of this had a positive result, in fact all the utilities which were efficient in the 
first interpretation, are still efficient also in the second one, and besides, the first 
case identified an even more higher number of efficient DMUs, also including 
SIMAR de Loures, SIMAR de Odivelas e Oiera and INDAQUA Matosinhos for 
a total of twelve efficient DMUs. 
 
Observing the data, we can find out that the presence of the word “outlier” is 
recurrent. 
The extremely efficient decision of making units are potential outliers, in our 
case an efficiency score superior to four is taken as it is. For “outlier” we do not 
have an exact definition ineeed.  
There is no clear definition to identify outliers in literature of DEA. Wilson 
quoted that “outliers are observations that do not fit in with the pattern of the 
remaining data points, and are not at all typical of the rest of the data”90 . He also 
defined influential observations as those sample observations which play a 
relatively large role in determining estimated efficiency scores for at least some 
other observations in the observed sample. 
Barnett and Lewis defined that  the outliers are inconsistent observations with the 
remainder set of data. Davies and Gather described outliers as those observations 
which have a different distribution from some assumed distribution for the non-
outliers. Fieller notes that there are two common themes to proposed definitions: 
(a) outliers are extreme observations in the sample; and (b) they are observations 
that are sufficiently extreme as to have an apparently low probability of 
occurrence or are surprising in some other way, even when adjudged as the 
extremes of the sample. 
Seaver and Triantis demonstrated that outliers and leverage points not only affect 
the magnitude of the derived technical efficiency measures, but also represent 
efficient or inefficient production performance, once measurement errors have 
been removed from the data set. 
                                      
90
 Gunst and Mason, 1980 
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Fox et all defined that outliers are observations which are different, in some 
sense, from the other observations in the sample. They also described an 
observation as a “scale outlier” if it is relatively larger or smaller in all, or has 
many dimensions of other observations, and called a “mix outlier” if it has an 
unusual combination in terms of the size of vector elements relative to other 
firms
91
. 
In the non-parametric analysis, as exposed previously, results may be invalidated 
by the presence of outlier measures inside the sample of analysis. The outlier 
units correspond to anomalous observations which generate results clearly far 
from the ones of the other available observations. In the table the unit A turns out 
to be outlier, significantly moving away from all the other DMUs of the sample. 
 
 
Source: My own  elaboration 
 
In fact, when big samples of data are analysed, it is normal that some of these 
may move away from the average of the sample. Then, it is important to identify 
and exclude such units from the sample of analysis, that is effectively what we 
have done.  
 
 
                                      
91
 Epstein M K and Henderson J C (1989) ‘Data envelopment analysis for managerial control and 
diagnosis’, Decision Sciences 
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Conclusion 
 
Through the years we came through various models made to measure the 
companies performances, in relation to the economic demands of the period; 
among these the non-parametric DEA methodology  ranked.  
Many companies adopted this model to study the efficiency and the 
benchmarking analysis towards homologous sector companies, since it has very 
significant advantages: flexibility, due to the possibility to adopt an orientation 
towards inputs, outputs or an additive one; the possibility to consider multi-input 
and multi-output situations; the cheapness of the analysis in terms of costs and 
time, besides the prior non-specification of the functional form for the 
representation of the productive models. 
We then applied the model in the version formulated by Banker Cooper (CCR), a 
model that allows to identify efficiency on a variable scale, in output-oriented 
mode, being the maximization of the output the companies object. 
The quantitative data available were: operative costs (inputs), number of 
employees (inputs), real loss of water in the distribution (inputs), the volume of 
water made drinkable by the various DMUs (outputs), the invoiced volume of 
water in cubic meters (outputs) and total customers (outputs). 
The work implied the formulation of two different models; the first one was 
based on three inputs and two outputs, while the second one on two inputs and 
one only output. 
 
Then, it has been applied the model to confront the two countries, Italy and 
Portugal, using the both interpretation of model DEA: first with output 
orientation and after we adopted the input orientation.  
In fact, for each model, there have been two different confrontations: Italy vs 
Italy and Portugal vs Portugal. In other words, the efficiency of each DMU was 
confronted with the efficiency border of the country of reference. All of this gave 
the relative efficiency of each one of the 44 DMUs taken into consideration;  
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With the output orientation and from the confrontation it resulted that the 
Portuguese companies present a higher score than the Italian ones, and so we can 
assume a major efficiency than the latter.  
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
 
The demonstration of the 'earlier statement can be read in the figure. 
The number of companies that have a score equal to 1 is a clear majority in 
Portugal. So 45% of the DMU Portuguese, turns out to be efficient with the first 
model taken into consideration and using an orientation output. 
By contrast, in Italy the percentage of inefficient companies is equal to 54%; 
This value however, does not fully reflect reality, because it must be said that 
only two out of seven companies in Toscana are efficient, something that is 
completely reversed for Piedmont. 
.With that, then, we can say that the Piedmont region has DMU more efficient 
than those located in Tuscany. 
The lowest mean in Portugal than Italian must not mislead. In fact we want 
remind that in output orientation if the value is very high is an inefficient 
situation. 
So as far as the average of Portugal we can say that the utilities could increase 
the level of 34,44% of the output if they used the input level in an efficient 
• N. of DMU efficient: 7 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 
156,97% 
Efficienzy Italy 
with 3 input and 
2 output 
• N. of DMU efficient: 14 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 
134,44% 
Efficiency 
Portugal with 3 
input and 2 
output 
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manner.  The organization is therefore inefficient because it could produce a 
quantity of output greater than it actually is producing.  
If we consider the second model we see that the same conclusions can be made: 
the Portuguese DMU are more efficient than Italian. 
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
 
From reading the text we can see that even if we take into account the input 
orientation using the first model, three input and two output, the conclusions are 
always the same. 
In this context, however, we must read the data in accordance with a different 
interpretation; if we take as reference the Italian average, 62%, this means that 
the Italian DMU should decrease the amount of the 38% input to achieve the 
same amount of output they are producing. 
For Portugal, the number of input to decrease is smaller than the Italian, 27%. 
As regards the number of efficient utitlity in our example it is interesting to 
observe how the number is equal, seven, both for the 'orientation output that for 
the' orientation input. 
At a time when we look better all, we understand that this issue also occurs for 
the other cases examined, so even in the case of Portugal. 
• N. of DMU efficient: 5 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 
156,50% 
Efficienzy Italy 
with 2 input and 
1 output 
• N. of DMU efficient: 12 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 
139,26% 
Efficiency 
Portugal with 2 
input and 1 
output 
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As described in the figuarda, efficient utitlity in our country are seven; deepening 
this figure we see that 28.5% are localized in Tuscany, while the remaining part, 
62% in Piedmont. 
This value is very useful to answer the question, which of the two regions is 
efficient. Obviously the Piedmont presents the number of DMU more efficient. 
The companies are able to go to decrease the input level to produce the usual d 
output level in a manner, in fact, more efficient. 
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
 
Everything we set out up to this moment is absolutely valid even if we take into 
account the input orientatio to the second model. 
The important results of analysis are, again, highlighted by the figure below. 
 
 
• N. of DMU efficient: 7 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 62% 
Efficienzy Italy 
with 3 input and 
2 output 
• N. of DMU efficient: 8 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 73% 
Efficiency 
Portugal with 3 
input and 2 
output 
167 
 
 
Source: my own elaboration 
 
If we take into account only the average value of the two countries, it we find the 
opposite trend compared to the value obtained using the first model. 
In the Italian case, the value has increased from 62% to 51%, it describe a rather 
complicated situation for the sector. A decrease of 50% of the inputs to achieve a 
level of efficiency is a very important step for different utitlity. 
For Portugal, there is a completely opposite situation, in fact The value has 
increased,  from 73% to 78%. In this situation the DMU approached still more 
toward the total efficiency. In any case, in a sector complicated and subject to 
many risks of any natuta,  the 80% is absolutely an excellent result. 
 
At the conclusion of our work we can make some observations. 
Overall, the companies operating in the Portuguese water sector appear to be 
more efficient,  both following a output orientation that input orientation. 
If we go to observe the individual regions for the two countries examined,  the 
highest percentage of efficient DMU is, for the Italy in Piedmont, while for 
Portugal in the Porto region. 
In any case,  we must say that in our example,  the number of Portuguese 
companies concerned is much greater than Italian,  twenty-nine against fifteen. 
So,  we can understand how the results described,  could, in any way, be distorted 
by this situation. 
• N. of DMU efficient: 5 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 0,51% 
Efficienzy Italy 
with 2 input and 
1 output 
• N. of DMU efficient: 9 
• MEAN of Efficiency score: 78% 
Efficiency 
Portugal with 2 
input and 1 
output 
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In the end, the explanation of this conclusion depends on numerous factors, 
which can space from the companies’ management to the internal staff, from the 
managerial efficiency to the regulation, from the climate aspects to the relation 
with the suppliers or the environmental associations. 
On the whole, the almost totality of the DMUs analysed is BCC-inefficient, but, 
at the same time, to contextualize and to deepen the results it would be useful to 
study in sectors to highlight if the trend is consistent with the productive units of 
the competitors’  companies.  
Note, furthermore, that both countries reformed the market structure of their 
water sector in the 1990s with the objective of becoming more efficient. and,  at 
the same time, perhaps, the regulator in Portugal has a bigger impact for 
achieving efficient levels into utility which act in the water sector. 
 
In conclusion, the DEA method turns out to be adequate to study the companies 
efficiency since it gave significant results, useful to the optimization of the 
company actions. 
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